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Logic will get you from A to B. Imagination will take you everywhere.
(Albert Einstein)

Abstract
Access control is a key feature of healthcare information systems. Access control is
about enforcing rules to ensure that only authorized users get access to resources
in a system. In healthcare systems this means protecting patient privacy. How-
ever, the top priority is always to provide the best possible care for a patient. This
depends on the clinicians having access to the information they need to make the
best, most informed, care decisions. Care processes are often unpredictable and
hard to map to strict access control rules. As a result, in emergency or otherwise
unexpected situations, clinicians need to be able to bypass access control. In a
crisis, availability of information takes precedence over privacy concerns. This du-
ality of concerns is what makes access control in healthcare systems so challenging
and interesting as a research subject.
To create access control models for healthcare we need to understand how health-
care works. Before creating a model we need to understand the requirements the
model should fulfill. Though many access control models have been proposed and
argued to be suitable for healthcare, little work has been published on access con-
trol requirements for healthcare. This PhD project has focused on bridging the
gap between formalized models and real world requirements for access control in
healthcare by targeting the following research goals:
RG1 To collect knowledge that forms a foundation for access control requirements
in healthcare systems.
RG2 To create improved access control models for healthcare systems based on
real requirements.
This PhD project has consisted of a number of smaller, distinct, but related
projects to reach the research goals. The main contributions can be summarized
as:
C1 Requirements for access control in healthcare: Studies performed on
audit data, in workshops, by observation and interviews have helped discover
requirements. Results from this work include methods for access control
requirements elicitation in addition to the actual requirements discovered.
C2 Process-based access control: The main conclusion from the requirements
work is that access control should be tailored to care processes. Care processes
are highly dynamic and often unpredictable, and access control needs to adapt
to this. This thesis suggests how existing sources of process information, both
explicit and implicit, may be used for this purpose.
C3 Personally controlled health records (PCHR): This thesis explores the
consequences of making the patient the administrator of access control and
proposes a model based on these initial requirements. From a performed
usability study it is clear that the main challenge is how to keep the patient
informed about the consequences of sharing.
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Introduction

Chapter 1
Introduction
It’s a job that’s never started that takes the longest to finish.
J. R. R. Tolkien
1.1 Background and motivation
Healthcare is information-intensive – vast amounts of information is created in
the course of a treatment process and access to this information is important
in the continuing care for the patient. Over the last decade, Electronic Health
Records (EHR1) have become increasingly common and widespread. However,
the EHR is not the only clinical information system in use. In any single hospital
one can often count more than a hundred separate clinical information systems,
ranging from common systems like the EHR to specific X-ray or lab systems. In
addition to these systems, much information is still only available on paper. Even
if healthcare is very technologically advanced in areas such as surgical equipment
and patient monitoring, in many aspects healthcare information systems are still
in their infancy.
Most healthcare information systems are local to a hospital or a doctor’s office, but
patients are not. Patients move, become ill while traveling, or simply choose to use
a different healthcare provider. Patients with long-term illnesses and/or a complex
diagnosis may receive services from many providers. There is a disconnect between
the way information is managed and the needs for access to that information.
Information remains in one place but patients do not. The explanation for this
disconnect is not simply the technological challenges of integrating systems and
information, but can be found in the legal frameworks regulating how sensitive
1Also often referred to as Electronic Patient Records (EPR)
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clinical information may, or may not, be shared. There is a strong, current focus
on resolving these issues, based on the fact that availability of correct, up-to-date
and complete information is crucial to make the best, most informed care decisions.
In 1997, the Norwegian government published a report named The patient first!
[1] outlining visions for a more patient-centric healthcare. “Openness”, “availabil-
ity” and a more “coherent care process” are among the ten goals listed in the
report. To fulfill these goals, availability of information needs to be improved for
healthcare personnel as well as for the patient and next of kin. The goals put
forth in this report are consistent with the current focus in healthcare worldwide.
Since the publication of the report in 1997 many projects have focused on improved
availability through information and systems integration, while other projects have
chosen the path of improved availability through new systems where the patient
manages access to information.
Healthcare systems may be categorized as security-critical systems. Other systems
often described as being security-critical include railroad signaling systems, nuclear
plant control systems, air traffic control systems as well as financial systems such
as the online banking systems most of us use. Access control is an important fea-
ture of all of these systems, but healthcare systems are different in one important
aspect. Access control is about making sure information is accessible only to au-
thorized users. Whereas in most other security-critical systems the default access
control rule is “when in doubt – deny”, for healthcare it will always be “when in
doubt – allow”. Protecting patient privacy is important, but the most important
goal is to provide the best possible care for patients, which depends on the clin-
icians having access to information. Hence, access control is a balance between
confidentiality and availability. This is what makes access control in healthcare
systems so challenging – and interesting as a research subject.
To ensure availability in emergencies or otherwise unexpected situations, mecha-
nisms that allow a user to override the access control is included in many healthcare
systems. Allowing access control to be overridden implies including functionality
in a system that may be misused. To minimize security risk, retrospective con-
trols such as extensive auditing are usually employed. In [2] this is described as
“optimistic security”.
An example illustrates what may happen, from a patient perspective:
JD has been suffering from abdominal pains for a while. As the pains
seem to become more frequent and severe he makes an appointment to
see his primary physician. The physician orders a number of tests but
finds nothing wrong. He decides that JD should be admitted to the
gastro2 ward at the hospital for further testing. When JD arrives at the
hospital the staff queries him about his medical history, what tests his
2Gastroenterology is the medical specialty devoted to the study, diagnosis and treatment of
disorders of the digestive system (www.medterms.com).
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doctor performed and what the results were. They take blood samples
from JD to send to the lab for further testing. When the tests are done
the results are entered into the EHR via the lab system. The clinicians
treating JD at the gastro ward then log onto the EHR system and
review the test results. The tests reveal a very high white blood cell
count. They suspect that JD may have leukemia and decides to transfer
him to the cancer ward immediately for further testing. The clinicians
can transfer JD physically but cannot change his “admitted to” status
in the system and JDs record is only accessible to people working at
the gastro ward where he is currently admitted. The clinicians at the
cancer ward are aware of this, so rather than using the EHR to prepare
for JDs arrival they ask the gastro ward to print a summary of their
findings so far and send it with JD. After having performed several
more tests they log onto the EHR by overriding the access control to
enter their findings (...)
This example illustrates what frequently happens to patients: they are given an
initial diagnosis that may change several times before the real problem is identified.
As the diagnosis, tests and treatment change they are transferred back and forth
and often asked to recount their medical history and treatment so far. The override
mechanisms are often used to handle common, recurring events that are not allowed
by the access control rules.
The existence of override mechanisms, and even the invention of the term “opti-
mistic security”, indicates that there is room for improvement on access control
in healthcare. It is also clear from the previous discussion that access control for
healthcare systems faces challenges that are unique and still unresolved.
1.1.1 Legal considerations
As mentioned, any healthcare system is bound by the legal framework of the coun-
try it resides in. In Norway, the most prominent legal frameworks for healthcare
information are: The Health Personnel Act (Helsepersonelloven), The Personal
Data Act (Personopplysningsloven) and The Personal Health Data Filing System
Act (Helseregisterloven).
The Health Personnel Act [3] regulates the conditions under which healthcare
personnel are allowed access to health information. This act also contains the
secrecy obligation (§21) that healthcare professionals are bound to. The secrecy
obligation is sometimes used as an argument against the need for heavy security
mechanisms in healthcare systems.
The Personal Data Act [4] defines what personal data is, and what rules regulate
the management of personal data. According to the Personal Data Act, healthcare
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information is considered “sensitive personal information” and there are strict rules
for who can create and manage records containing this type of information.
The Personal Health Data Filing System Act [5] is specific to records of health
information. It defines who may be responsible for the management of health
records (the data controller3), and also the conditions under which this manage-
ment may be performed by some other entity (the data processor4) on behalf of
the controller. Of particular interest is §13:
Only the data controller, the data processors and persons working under
the instructions of the controller or the processor may be granted access
to personal health data (transl.).
In Norway the public health service is organized in four health regions: north,
central, west, and south-east. Within each health region there are several health
enterprises. Current legal interpretation prohibits the direct sharing of healthcare
information on a level higher than the health enterprise, with an argumentation
founded on §13 in the Personal Health Data Filing System Act. This means that
while it may be desirable from a user viewpoint, and possible form a technical
viewpoint, it is currently not legal to have systems for shared electronic patient
records across organizational boundaries. The only legal way to share data across
borders, organizational or national, is if the patient gives his/her informed consent.
This consent is normally only valid for one sharing instance and there is also an
ongoing discussion about the requirements for an informed consent.
The legal situation is no less complicated in other countries which implies that
legally sharing health data across national borders is close to impossible. Resolving
the legal issues for enabling shared care is one of the most important challenges
for the future and something that will affect the development of future IT systems
for healthcare. Legal considerations also affect the requirements for access control
in healthcare. However, this PhD project has a technical focus and therefore will
not discuss legal considerations in-depth.
1.2 Research focus
Current research on access control largely tends toward a theoretical approach.
A quick search on google, or skimming the bibliography of this thesis, reveals a
large number of scientific papers presenting diverse access control models. Many of
them use healthcare as a motivating example, but very few are based on empirical
studies that support the selection of model properties or explain in more detail
why the models are suitable for a healthcare setting. Research on access control
3no: databehandlingsansvarlig
4no: databehandler
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may be viewed as a continuum from theoretical via implementation-centric to
user- and problem focused. Research so far tends toward the former while little
has been done on the latter. Motivated by this fact, this PhD project has taken a
practical approach to access control in healthcare. The focus has been on increasing
our understanding of information and access needs to be able to create access
control models that are better tailored to reality. Only when we have a better
understanding of the everyday reality of healthcare workers and their patients
does it make sense to propose solutions in the form of access control models for
healthcare information systems. The main goal is to create access control models
that minimize the need for use of override mechanisms and “optimistic security”.
1.2.1 Research goals
To summarize, the research goals for this PhD project are:
RG1 To collect knowledge that forms a foundation for access control requirements
in healthcare systems.
RG2 To create improved access control models for healthcare systems based on
real requirements.
1.3 Publications
The research performed as part of this project has resulted in the publication of a
number of scientific papers that are listed here. The papers can be placed in three
groups based on area of contribution:
C1 Requirements for access control in healthcare
C2 Process-based access control
C3 Personally controlled health records
The papers in the requirements group present methods for access control require-
ments elicitation created in this project and results of using these methods. The
main conclusion from the requirements elicitation studies was that access control
models need to be more dynamic, and able to adapt to and support care processes.
The papers grouped under the heading process-based access controls present access
control models that are motivated by the findings in the requirements work. Fi-
nally, the group of papers on personally controlled health records takes a different
viewpoint where the responsibility for access control administration is shifted from
a skilled administrator to the patient. This work was motivated by a research stay
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in Boston in 2007 working with the team at the Children’s Hospital Informatics
Program5 that develop the Indivo6 personally controlled health record.
At the time of writing nine of the papers have been published. The last paper
has been accepted for publication at a workshop taking place in March 2009, and
the final, camera-ready, version of the paper is included here. The papers are
listed here in the order they appear in the second part of the thesis. Rather than
using chronological ordering by publication date, the papers have been grouped
according to topic as explained in the previous section.
Requirements for access control in healthcare
• Paper A: Lillian Røstad, Access Control in Healthcare Applications, NOKO-
BIT05, ISSN: 1504-1697, ISBN: 82-8033-026-7, p. 2441-253, Bergen 22.-23.
November 2005.
• Paper B: Lillian Røstad and Ole Edsberg, A Study of Access Control Re-
quirements for Healthcare Systems Based on Audit Trails from Access Logs,
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), ISSN: 1063-
9527, ISBN: 0-7695-2716-7, p. 175-186, Miami, December 11-15 2006.
• Paper C: Lillian Røstad, An extended misuse case notation: Including vulner-
abilities and the insider threat, The Twelfth Working Conference on Require-
ments Engineering: Foundation for Software Quality (REFSQ’06), Essener
Informatik Beitrage, ISBN: 3-922602-26, p. 33-43, Luxembourg, June 5-6
2006.
• Paper D: Per H˚akon Meland, Lillian Røstad, Inger Anne Tøndel, Øystein
Nytrø, The iAccess Handbook: A Methodology for Access Control Integration,
Medinfo 2007: Proceedings of the 12th World Congress on Health (Medical)
Informatics – Building Sustainable Health Systems, IOS Press, ISSN: 0926-
9630, p. 2015-2016, Brisbane, August 20-24 2007.
• Paper E: Lillian Røstad, Per H˚akon Meland, Inger Anne Tøndel and Øys-
tein Nytrø, Access Control and Integration of Health Care Systems: An
Experience Report and Future Challenges, Second International Workshop
“Dependability Aspects on Data WArehousing and Mining applications”
DAWAM 2007, in conjunction with The International Conference on Avail-
ability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2007), IEEE Computer Society 2007,
ISBN: 0-7695-2775-2, p. 871-878, Vienna, April 10-13 2007.
5www.chip.org
6www.indivohealth.org
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Process-based access control
• Paper F: Lillian Røstad, MG-RBAC: Using Medical Guidelines as a Source
of Contextual Information to Activate and Deactivate Roles and Permissions,
Medinfo 2007: Proceedings of the 12th World Congress on Health (Medical)
Informatics – Building Sustainable Health Systems, IOS Press, ISSN: 0926-
9630, p. 1741-1743, Brisbane, August 20-24 2007.
• Paper G: Lillian Røstad and Øystein Nytrø, Towards Dynamic Access Con-
trol for Healthcare Information Systems, Medical Informatics Europe (MIE
2008), IOS Press 2008, ISBN: 978-1-58603-864-9, p. 703-708, Gøteborg,
Sweden, May 26-28 2008. Extended edition invited to be submitted to the
journal Methods of information in medicine.
Personally controlled health records
• Paper H: Lillian Røstad, An Initial Model and a Discussion of Access Con-
trol in Patient Controlled Health Records, The International Workshop on
Privacy and Assurance (WPA-2008), in conjunction with The International
Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2008), IEEE
Computer Society 2008, ISBN: 0-7695-3102-4, p. 935-942, Barcelona, March
4-7 2008.
• Paper I: Lillian Røstad and Øystein Nytrø, Personalized Access Control for
Personally Controlled Health Records, The 2nd Computer Security Architec-
ture Workshop (in conjunction with 15th ACM Conference on Computers
and Communication Security), ISBN: 978-1-60558-287-0, p. 9-15, George
Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, October 31st 2008.
• Paper J: Lillian Røstad and Ole Andreas Alsos, Patient-Administered Access
Control: a Usability Study, accepted for publication at Security and Usabil-
ity (SECUSAB) 2009, in conjunction with The International Conference on
Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2009), Fukuoka, March 16-19
2009.
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1.4 List of terms
This list includes terms that need to have a clear definition within the context of
this thesis.
Security-related terms
All definitions are from RFC 4949 Internet Security Glossary (Version 2) [6]. RFC
4949 sometimes provides several definitions for one term. In this list, only the
definition regarded most appropriate for this thesis is included.
Information security Measures that implement and assure security services in
information systems, including in computer systems and in communication
systems.
Availability The property of a system or a system resource being accessible, or
usable or operational upon demand, by an authorized system entity, accord-
ing to performance specifications for the system; i.e., a system is available
if it provides services according to the system design whenever users request
them.
(Data) Confidentiality The property that data is not disclosed to system enti-
ties unless they have been authorized to know the data.
(Data) Integrity The property that data has not been changed, destroyed, or
lost in an unauthorized or accidental manner.
Privacy The right of individuals to control or influence what information related
to them may be collected and stored and by whom and to whom that infor-
mation may be disclosed.
Access control A process by which use of system resources is regulated accord-
ing to a security policy and is permitted only by authorized entities (users,
programs, processes, or other systems) according to that policy.
Authorization An approval that is granted to a system entity to access a system
resource.
Authorized user A system entity that accesses a system resource for which the
entity has received an authorization.
Permission An authorization or set of authorizations to perform security-relevant
functions in the context of role-based access control. Tutorial: A permission
is a positively stated authorization for access that (a) can be associated with
one or more roles and (b) enables a user in a role to access a specified set of
system resources by causing a specific set of system actions to be performed
on the resources.
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Role-based access control (RBAC) A form of identity-based access control
wherein the system entities that are identified and controlled are functional
positions in an organization or process. Tutorial: Administrators assign
permissions to roles as needed to perform functions in the system. Admin-
istrators separately assign user identities to roles. When a user accesses the
system in an identity (for which the user has been registered) and initiates
a session using a role (to which the user has been assigned), then the per-
missions that have been assigned to the role are available to be exercised by
the user.
Healthcare informatics related terms
All definitions are from prEN 13940-1 Health Informatics - System of Concepts to
Support Continuity of Care - Part1: Basic Concepts [7].
Health care (healthcare) Services, or supplies related to the health of an indi-
vidual.
Health care organisation Organisation involved in the direct provision of health
care activities.
Health care professional Person authorised by law or official regulations to be
involved in the direct provision of health care activities.
Health care provider Health care professional or health care organisation in-
volved in the direct provision of health care activities.
Subject of care Person, or other living subject, seeking to receive, receiving or
having received health care activities.
Health record Repository of information regarding the health of a subject of
care.
Electronic Health Record (EHR) 7 Repository of information regarding the
health of a subject of care, in computer processable form.
Clinical information Information regarding the health of a subject of care, recorded,
or meant to be recorded, in some health record.
Clinical guideline Set of systematically developed statements to assist the de-
cision of health care parties about health care activities to be provided with
regard to a health issue in specified clinical circumstances.
7Or Electronic Patient Record (EPR). In the context of this thesis the terms EHR and EPR
are used interchangeably.
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Encounter/patient contact Contact in the course of which health care activi-
ties are delivered to a subject of care in her or his presence, and her or his
health record is accessed to and managed.
Episode of care Situation during which health care activities are performed by
one health care provider to address one health issue.
Period of care Situation during which one or more contacts occur between a
subject of care and one or several health care professionals, in the framework
of a care mandate held by a health care provider.
Shared care Organisational principle where two or more health care providers
jointly co-operate to provide health care activities to a subject of care for a
continuing health issue.
Note: in this thesis the terms “care” and “treatment” are used frequently. In the
context of this thesis a “treatment” is a specific step, or set of steps, performed as
part of a larger care process. Patient “care” is used in a wider context including
all services provided for a patient and may include several treatments.
1.5 Thesis outline
This thesis is divided into two parts: the introduction and the published papers.
The first part includes motivation and background for the project, a summary of
the research process and contributions, summaries of the papers in part two, and
concluding remarks including suggestions for future work.
The second part of the thesis contains the papers that constitute the main results
of this PhD project.
At the end of the thesis a bibliography of all references used in the papers is
included.
Chapter 2
Research process and
contributions
“If you keep at it, one day something which at first appeared impossible will become
merely something very difficult indeed.”
Danny Paradise (American Yoga instructor, b.1943)
This chapter describes the research process and how the results of this PhD project
came to be what they are.
2.1 A shift of focus - from solving to
understanding
Albert Einstein is frequently quoted to have said:
“If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called research,
would it?”
This quote illustrates why research projects are hard to plan. Re-planning research
projects as new knowledge is discovered is very common and often necessary. This
is also true for this PhD project. The project started out with a brief problem
description that was refined into a more detailed project plan over the first year
of the project.
The original title of this PhD project was Context- and Role-Based Dynamic Access
Control in Distributed Healthcare Information Systems and the intention was to
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develop access control models that were “context-aware”, “more dynamic” and
overall better suited to the needs of healthcare. However, it quickly became clear
that the information needed to design such models simply did not exist. As a
result, the main focus of this project shifted towards eliciting requirements for
access control in healthcare and exploring how this knowledge may be used to
create improved access control models. The research goals, as stated in section
1.2.1, have been:
RG1 To collect knowledge that forms a foundation for access control requirements
in healthcare systems.
RG2 To create improved access control models for healthcare systems based on
real requirements.
2.2 Research approach
A number of different research methods have been used on the different sub-
projects that have been part of this PhD project and several studies have been
performed. Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the different studies - linking them
to contribution area1, research goals2 and what papers the results have been pub-
lished in. Not all published papers are directly linked to studies because the thesis
also includes position papers and papers on developed methods. In the figure these
papers have been placed close to, or in the transition between, studies that they
have inspired or been inspired by.
As figure 2.1 shows, the different studies may be classified as quantitative or qual-
itative depending on the sample size (number of participants). Most of the studies
performed in this project have been qualitative and only the log study qualifies as
quantitative. The following studies have been performed:
Quantitative studies:
• Investigation of access control audit trails: in healthcare systems all access to
information is registered in the audit log. As part of this PhD project a study
of access log data for one month collected from eight hospitals in Central
Norway was performed. The collected logs contained a total of 1 794 153
entries. The study revealed that the use of the override mechanism for access
control constituted 17% of all accesses to patient records. The study focused
on the reasons why the users needed to override the normal access control.
The findings from the study are presented in paper B: A Study of Access
1C1 Requirements for access control in healthcare, C2 Process-based access control and C3
Personally controlled health records as explained in section 1.3
2as presented in section 1.2.1
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Case study: 
Access control 
in healthcare
2004/2005
Workshops:
Requirements for
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2005
Usability studies:
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Experiences with
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Clinicians’ use of 
information
2005 (2007)
Paper J
Paper G
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Control Requirements for Healthcare Systems Based on Audit Trails from
Access Logs. Findings from this study inspired the study of observational
data to examine access needs from an internal and external viewpoint.
Qualitative studies:
• (Semi-) structured interviews were performed on a small user base to gather
feedback about user experiences related to information access for a portal
that integrates several healthcare systems. The interviews were performed
in an organization where workshops were also performed.
• Workshops: tailored workshops were used to elicit requirements for access
control in a healthcare system integration context. The output of the work-
shops was summarized in extended UML activity diagrams. The workshops
and diagrams are described in paper D: The iAccess Handbook: A Method-
ology for Access Control Integration. The results from interviews and work-
shops are presented together in paper E: Access Control and Integration of
Health Care Systems: An Experience Report and Future Challenges.
• Observation: paper G Towards Dynamic Access Control for Healthcare Infor-
mation Systems utilizes data from observational studies of healthcare pro-
fessionals’ use of different information sources in their clinical work. The
observations were performed by summer students in 2005 and the data they
collected was analyzed with a focus on identifying information sources used
by clinicians in specific situations and interpreted from an access control
viewpoint in 2007.
• Case studies: paper A Access Control in Healthcare Applications is based
on an informal case study of access control mechanisms in the dominant
electronic health record systems used in Norway. Performing these studies
of existing systems was necessary to understand the research challenges for
access control in healthcare. These case studies were very important for
the understanding of shortcomings of access control in healthcare as it is
implemented and in use today, and as figure 2.1 shows, these case studies
inspired many of the studies to be performed later in the PhD project.
• Usability studies: paper J Visualization for Patient-Administered Access
Control: a Usability Study presents findings from a usability study where
the goal was to observe and analyze the user’s reaction when presented with
a system where it was obvious that they could, in detail, determine the access
they wanted to give others to their health information. Three different de-
signs were tested for usability, and card-ranking was utilized to get feedback
from the users on which design they preferred and why.
2.3 Publications and contributions 17
2.3 Publications and contributions
This PhD project has consisted of a number of smaller projects resulting in a total
of ten scientific papers. All papers are included in their final version. At the time
of writing nine of these papers have been published, while one has been accepted
for publication at the ARES workshop Security and Usability (SECUSAB) taking
place in March 2009.
Figure 2.2 provides an overview of the written papers, how they fit together and
which papers inspired or led to others. The papers are grouped by contribution
area, C1-C3, as explained in section 1.3. Additionally, group C1 (requirements)
has been further subdivided into papers presenting methods for requirements elic-
itation, and papers presenting results of applying those methods. The figure also
illustrates that two of the requirements papers have a special focus on system
integration.
The next sections present the papers and contributions in more detail.
2.3.1 C1: Requirements for access control in healthcare
As illustrated in the figure, and as mentioned in the previous sections, a major
focus has been on better understanding of requirements for access control in health-
care and three of the published papers focus mainly on requirements. The first
paper Access Control in Healthcare Applications was written very early on and
published in 2005 at The Norwegian Conference on Organizations’ use of Infor-
mation Technology (NOKOBIT). The paper is based on a case study of electronic
health record (EHR) systems in use in Norway and presents a generalized access
control model for healthcare. The model comprises common properties of the ac-
cess control models in the systems that have been studied. This generalized model
illustrates how access control is static (define once - use many) in many systems,
and also explains how access in exceptional circumstances, such as emergencies, is
handled by allowing the user to override access control. This is often referred to
as “exception access”.
Learning about the use of exception access mechanisms inspired the study of audit
logs presented in the paper A Study of Access Control Requirements for Healthcare
Systems Based on Audit Trails from Access Logs. The study revealed that the use
of exception access mechanisms triggers extensive logging of the users’ activities
from that point on and that users have to provide a reason for using exception
access. The idea for this paper was to examine how common the use of these
access mechanisms was, and to see if the information in the audit logs could reveal
requirements for access control. The assumption was that any frequently occurring
event may be a candidate for inclusion as an allowed access control rule. The study
revealed that exception access was used to access the EHRs of about 50% of the
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patients in the study period and 17% of all accesses were performed using exception
access. We found that a relatively small number of similar reasons were provided
for using exception access, including out-patient clinic encounters and physician
referrals. Clearly, these are events that should be handled by the access control.
Methods for access control requirements elicitation
Requirements elicitation requires the use of appropriate methods, which sometimes
leads to creation of new methods or adaptation of existing ones. Two papers pre-
senting new or adapted methods for requirements elicitation have been published
as part of this project.
The paper An extended misuse case notation: Including vulnerabilities and the
insider threat presents an extension of the misuse case notation. The misuse
case notation is itself an extension of UML use cases. Use cases describe desired
functionality in a system and misuse cases extend the UML use case notation by
adding negative use cases and negative actors (colored black) to illustrate threats
and attackers respectively. The main contribution of the extended misuse case
notation is adding notations to represent threats from insiders and vulnerable
system functionality. That is, desirable system functionality that may be exploited
by an attacker. This notation was created to be able to represent and illustrate
the threat posed by exception access mechanisms in healthcare systems.
Integration
Information and system integration is among the most important challenges faced
by healthcare today. Currently, the reality is that there are hundreds of discon-
nected clinical systems in use at any hospital, and most systems are local to a
ward, clinic, or hospital. Access control is tightly coupled with information and
depends on knowledge of information structure. This means that when integrating
systems and information, access control integration is a major challenge.
One of the papers on requirement elicitation methods has a special focus on in-
tegration of healthcare information systems and access control. The paper, The
iAccess Handbook: A Methodology for Access Control Integration, presents a hand-
book consisting of two parts: relevant reference information and a set of meth-
ods to collect, analyze, structure and represent relevant information for access
control integration. The handbook focuses on the legal, technical, and organi-
zational aspects of integration and should serve as an aid in the access control
integration process. At the time of writing, the handbook can be found online at
http://iaccess.idi.ntnu.no.
The paper, Access Control and Integration of Health Care Systems: An Experience
Report and Future Challenges, reports findings from a study of one such integration
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effort with a focus on access control. It turns out that in the system under study
access control is not integrated at all. A portal has been created to offer a common
access point to several subsystems. An access control mechanism implemented in
the portal decides what subsystems a user can access through the portal, but
deciding what access the user has to information is left to the different subsystems
by forwarding the user’s credentials from the portal. This study illustrates a
practical approach taken on the path towards integration and provides insight
into the difficulties of access control integration.
2.3.2 C2: Process-based access control
From the requirements work it became clear that many access control mechanisms
implemented in existing systems are too static, in the sense that access rules rarely
change or are updated after a patient is admitted. Access usually depends on what
ward a patient is admitted to, where a user is working and the profession (doctor,
nurse etc.) of the user. However, the care process for a patient is dynamic and
individual. To improve access control, and minimize the use of exception access
mechanisms, access control should be process-based – tailored to workflows in
healthcare and dynamic in the sense that access rules change or are updated as
the care process changes.
Medical guidelines are idealized representations of the treatment process for a pa-
tient with a specific diagnosis. The paper MG-RBAC: Using Medical Guidelines
as a Source of Contextual Information to Activate and Deactivate Roles and Per-
missions presents how the information in medical guidelines may be utilized in
process-based access control. This is illustrated with an example medical guide-
line on treatment of Gestational Diabetes Mellitus (GDM)3. The guideline includes
instructions on how often the patient should see her doctor. This could be used to
open the EHR for access for the doctor around the next scheduled appointment,
rather than it being accessible all the time. According to the GDM guideline the
patient is to monitor her glucose level and if it exceeds a certain limit she needs to
see her doctor. If access to the EHR was linked to the GDM guideline the EHR
could be made accessible to the patient’s doctor in the event of a too high glucose
level measurement.
Using information in medical guidelines as a foundation for access control neces-
sitates a tight coupling between the computerized guidelines and the healthcare
information system. This will be a challenge as today there are not that many
guidelines that have been encoded in a computerized format and the knowledge
base would be incomplete. Access control can therefore not be based on guidelines
alone, but the existing guidelines may serve as a valuable addition to the access
control ruleset.
3A form of diabetes found in pregnant women.
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The study of audit logs led to a realization that the logs in healthcare systems con-
tain information that could be used as a valuable source of work process knowledge.
Data mining techniques could be applied to historical log data to extract usage
patterns. The techniques to be used would be similar to the ones used in anomaly-
based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Anomaly (or abnormality) based intru-
sion detection was described by Dorothy Denning in [8] as a technique where one
attempts to train the system to recognize normal use and detect intrusions based
on deviations from what is considered normal use. In [9] Lee and Stolfo discuss
their experiences in using data mining approaches for intrusion detection and sug-
gest an approach using classification, association rules, and frequency episodes to
discover patterns in audit data and also to guide the audit data gathering process.
Other studies have focused on slightly different techniques, but common to them
all is the attempt to extract usage patterns from audit data by data mining tech-
niques. However, existing anomaly-based IDSs are focused on detecting anomalies
in logs of use encoded in network protocols. Taking this to the application level,
where use is not encoded in a standardized protocol and much more unpredictable,
is a very challenging task.
Usage patterns from audit logs could form the basis for access control rules. Con-
tinuous monitoring and mining of the logs would allow access rules to adapt as
the care process evolves. The paper Towards Dynamic Access Control for Health-
care Information Systems suggests a model where audit data, in combination with
medical guidelines and knowledge gathered by observation, may be used for more
dynamic, process-based, access control in healthcare. Using the audit data in com-
bination with observational data and guidelines enables us to tap into knowledge
from three different viewpoints: the user, the system and the idealized version.
Combining several viewpoints hopefully leads to a more complete understanding
of information access needs.
2.3.3 C3: Access control for Personally Controlled Health
Records
Three of the papers that are part of this thesis focus on access control issues related
to Personally Controlled Health Records (PCHRs). PCHRs may contribute to
solving the challenges of information sharing and exchange because the patient is
able to take his clinical information with him and decide who gets access. From
an access control viewpoint, PCHRs are interesting mainly because the patient is
made the administrator of access control.
The work presented in these papers was initiated during a six month (February
– July) research stay in 2007 at the The Harvard-MIT Division of Health Sci-
ences and Technology (HST) working with the team at the Children’s Hospital
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Informatics Program (CHIP)4 that is developing the Indivo5 PCHR.
The paper An Initial Model and a Discussion of Access Control in Patient Con-
trolled Health Records presents an overview of issues related to access control in
PCHRs. The paper highlights transparency as one of the main concerns for access
control in a PCHR. When the patient is administrator it is important that the
system is transparent in the sense that the consequences of sharing are obvious
and immediate to the patient. The goal is to make sure that the patient is in-
formed when sharing. The paper presents a sketch of a model for access control
in a PCHR with a focus on important issues that need further investigation.
The paper Personalized Access Control for a Personally Controlled Health Record
presents a more detailed model suggesting how these issues may be handled in an
access control model for a PCHR. The model is semi-formally defined. Core prop-
erties of the model are the two sets of access policies (common and personal) and
the definition of policy adaption hierarchies stating how policies may be combined.
As a patient could be anybody, very little can be assumed about the user in
terms of technical skills, computer literacy etc. Therefore, the usability of the
sharing interface (where access rights are assigned) becomes crucial to keep the
patient informed about consequences of sharing. The last paper, Visualization for
Patient-Administered Access Control: a Usability Study, reports findings from a
usability study where three different sharing interfaces for a PCHR were evaluated
and compared. The demos were built using a mock-up of the Indivo user interface
and the people participating in the testing were familiar with the Indivo system
and the PCHR concept. All the demos allowed the user to either select a prede-
fined access policy when sharing or create a new policy, based on an existing one or
from scratch. The contents (permissions on information) of the policies were visu-
alized in the interface using different styles in three different demos: list, cube and
rainbow. The study resulted in some valuable insights. One particularly interest-
ing thing was that once the patients realized that they could change the policies
to fit what they wanted exactly, all of the users almost always did make some
changes. Another interesting point that came up is the fact that system-defined
access policy templates have a lot of authority. If the users trust the system then
they may implicitly trust the suggested policies and assume that they are correct.
Therefore, creating these policies is a major responsibility.
4www.chip.org
5www.indivohealth.org
Chapter 3
Results
There is no spoon.
(The Matrix)
This chapter presents the papers that have been published as part of this PhD
project. The papers are presented in groups: section 3.1 presents the papers
related to requirements for access control in healthcare, section 3.2 presents the
papers on process-based access control, and section 3.3 presents the papers on
access control in personally controlled health records. For each paper a short
summary is provided, consisting of the original abstract, publication details, author
contributions and remarks including any errors discovered after publication. At the
end of each section is a brief summation of the combined results and contributions
of papers in that group.
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3.1 C1: Requirements for access control in health-
care
This section presents papers related to contribution area C1 requirements.
3.1.1 Paper A: Access Control in Healthcare Applications
Abstract
Healthcare personnel are dependant on access to relevant information to be able to
provide the best possible health care for their patients. Designing access control
for healthcare information systems is tricky, because of the dynamic nature of
the organizations and the tasks performed. Most existing implementations solve
this need through the use of access control exception mechanisms: if the normal
access control mechanism won’t grant a user legitimate access it is possible to use
some exception mechanism to gain access to required information - for example
in the case of an emergency. This paper discusses the special needs of access
control in healthcare information systems and presents how these needs have been
solved, or attempted solved, based on a study of a selection of clinical healthcare
systems in use that has resulted in a generalized access control model. Role-
based access control (RBAC) is the common principle for designing these access
control mechanisms, and this article concludes with a discussion on how these
implementations deviate from the RBAC principle and discusses if RBAC is indeed
sufficient to fulfill the requirements of healthcare systems or if we need extensions
to RBAC or an entirely new access control principle.
Remarks
This paper was written very early on. It presents a summary of the author’s
understanding of access control in healthcare based on a limited study of existing
systems.
Author contributions
This paper was written entirely by Lillian Røstad.
Publication details
This paper was published in the proceedings of NOKOBIT 2005 (The Norwegian
Conference on Organizations’ use of Information Technology) and presented at the
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NOKOBIT conference in Bergen, Norway in November 2005.
3.1.2 Paper B: A Study of Access Control Requirements
for Healthcare Systems Based on Audit Trails from
Access Logs
Abstract
In healthcare, role-based access control systems are often extended with exception
mechanisms to ensure access to needed information even when the needs don’t
follow the expected patterns. Exception mechanisms increase the threats to patient
privacy, and therefore their use should be limited and subject to auditing. We have
studied access logs from a hospital EPR system with extensive use of exception-
based access control. We found that the uses of the exception mechanisms were
too frequent and widespread to be considered exceptions. The huge size of the log
and the use of predefined or uninformative reasons for access make it infeasible
to audit the log for misuse. The informative reasons that were given provided
starting points for requirements on how the usage needs should be accomplished
without exception-based access. With more structured and fine-grained logging,
analysis of access logs could be a very useful tool for learning how to reduce the
need for exception-based access.
Remarks
Some minor errors in the numbers were discovered after publication. They do not
affect any of the conclusions, but are presented here for completeness purposes:
• In Table 2 the number of users with actualization permission should be 12289,
not 12298.
• In Table 3 the number of EPRs accessed using emergency access should be 48
not 67. 67 was the total number of emergency accesses. 48 was the number
of patients whose records were accessed using emergency access.
• In Table 4 the total number of accesses using actualization should be 275762,
not 297742. This is due to an error in the query. This means that the average
number of accesses of one EPR within one actualization period should be 2.06
and not 2.31.
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Author contributions
This paper was written by Lillian Røstad and Ole Edsberg. Røstad wrote the
main parts of the paper. Edsberg contributed on data analysis.
Publication details
This paper was published in the proceedings of the 22nd Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference (ACSAC 06), IEEE Computer Society, ISBN 0-7695-2716-
7. The paper was presented at ACSAC in Miami, Florida, December 2006.
3.1.3 Paper C: An extended misuse case notation: Including
vulnerabilities and the insider threat
Abstract
Misuse cases are a useful technique for eliciting and modeling security require-
ments and threats. In addition they may be very useful in a risk analysis process,
particularly as part of the system development process. The original misuse case
notation adds inverted use cases to model threats and inverted actors to represent
attackers. However, an attack is usually performed by exploiting a vulnerability
in a system and it would be useful to be able to represent vulnerable functions in
a model. In addition, it should be possible to discern between insiders and outside
attackers in a model, as they have very different abilities and potential for attack-
ing a system. This paper therefore proposes an extended misuse case notation
that includes the ability to represent vulnerabilities and the insider threat, and
discusses the use of this extended notation in the system development and risk
analysis processes.
Remarks
The creation of the notation presented in this paper was motivated by the fact
that access control mechanisms in healthcare often includes break-the-glass mech-
anisms that clearly can be misused. We needed a notation to be able to express
the risk represented by these mechanisms. However, the notation has proved use-
ful on a more general basis. Creating misuse cases is an important activity when
performing risk analysis of software systems. This extended notation helps high-
light what functionality in a system may be misused and makes it easier to link
countermeasures directly to the vulnerable functionality.
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Author contributions
This paper was written entirely by Lillian Røstad.
Publication details
This paper was published in the proceedings of REFSQ 2006 (The Twelfth Interna-
tional Working Conference on Requirements Engineering: Foundation for Software
Quality) and presented at REFSQ in Luxembourg, June 2006.
3.1.4 Paper D: The iAccess Handbook: A Methodology for
Access Control Integration
Abstract
Health care information about a patient is usually scattered among several clinical
systems - potentially more than a hundred separate systems just within one hos-
pital. System integration and interoperability is difficult to achieve, and various
strategies for integration exist. However, one topic that has not received much
attention is how to integrate system specific security mechanisms such as access
control. This paper presents the iAccess handbook, which is a tool to aid this
process. It consists of a repository of reference information and a set of methods
for collecting information and presenting results, and concerns the legal, organiza-
tional and technological aspects of integrated access control for health information
systems. The methods have been applied on two separate integration efforts in
Norway, which affect ten hospitals in total.
Remarks
The original five-page paper is included in this thesis. After acceptance the paper
had to be reduced to a 2-page summary and resubmitted. The original version is
included here because it provides more detail.
Author contributions
This paper is based on work performed in the iAccess project. iAccess was funded
by the The Research Council of Norway and project participants included the
Norwegian University of Science and Technology and the independent research
organization SINTEF. This paper was co-authored with Per H˚akon Meland and
Inger Anne Tøndel from SINTEF and Øystein Nytrø. All authors contributed
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equally to the work presented in the paper. The paper was written mainly by
Meland, Røstad and Tøndel. Nytrø contributed with comments and refinement of
the paper.
Publication details
This paper was presented as a poster at MedInfo 2007 - 12th World Congress on
Health (Medical) Informatics, Brisbane, Australia, August 2007.
3.1.5 Paper E: Access Control and Integration of Health
Care Systems: An Experience Report and Future Chal-
lenges
Abstract
Health information about a patient is usually scattered among several clinical
systems, which limits the availability of the information. Integration of the most
central systems is a possible solution to this problem. In this paper we present
one such integration effort, with a focus on how access control is handled in the
integrated system. Although this effort has not yet solved all the issues of access
control integration, it demonstrates a practical approach for creating something
that works today and serves as input to the discussion on future challenges for
access control when integrating multiple systems.
Remarks
This paper illustrates how hard integration of access control is. The effort described
here is far from a solution, but serves well as an illustration of a practical approach
and to highlight challenges.
Author contributions
This paper is based on work performed in the iAccess project. iAccess was funded
by the The Research Council of Norway and project participants included the
Norwegian University of Science and Technology and the independent research
organization SINTEF. This paper was co-authored with Per H˚akon Meland and
Inger Anne Tøndel from SINTEF and Øystein Nytrø. The paper was written
mainly by Røstad, Meland and Tøndel. Nytrø contributed with comments and
refinement of the paper.
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Publication details
This paper was published in the proceedings of The Second International Con-
ference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2007), IEEE Computer
Society, ISBN 0-7695-2775-2. The paper was presented at the Second Interna-
tional Workshop “Dependability Aspects on Data WArehousing and Mining ap-
plications” (DAWAM 2007) in conjunction with ARES in Vienna, Austria, April
2007.
3.1.6 Summary of contributions
The papers in this group are related to research goal RG1 and contribution area
C1 as presented in chapter 1. The contributions of the papers related to access
control requirements are twofold: some papers (A, B and E) report on actual
requirements for access control while others (C and D) present method for access
control elicitation.
Very little previous work exists on access control requirements for healthcare. One
notable exception is a paper by Evered and Bo¨geholz [10], but even this paper
has a very limited scope, basing the requirements on a study of the use of one
healthcare information system in a small aged care facility. The purpose of the
paper is to illustrate the complexity of the resulting permissions and constraints
even for a relatively simple system and setting.
In this project the initial approach was to understand existing healthcare systems;
what works well and what does not work about access control mechanism that are
implemented and in use. A combination of studies has led to the conclusion that
the main problem is that existing access control is enforced as a set of static rules,
while the access needs in healthcare are dynamic and unpredictable. The next step
in the PhD project therefore was to create methods and models for more dynamic
access control that is based on real and realistic requirements in correspondence
with research goal RG2.
30 Results
3.2 C2: Process-based access control
This section presents papers related to contribution area C2 process-based access
control.
3.2.1 Paper F: MG-RBAC: Using Medical Guidelines as a
Source of Contextual Information to Activate and De-
activate Roles and Permission
Abstract
Controlling access to information is a key concern in healthcare systems. Some
form of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is implemented in most healthcare
systems. A problem with existing RBAC models used in healthcare is their static
nature which doesn’t capture the dynamic needs of healthcare providers. In this
paper we propose an enhanced access control mode combining RBAC with the
use of Medical Guidelines, MG-RBAC. Medical guidelines contain temporal and
contextual information that may be used to make more informed, dynamic access
control decisions.
Remarks
The original four-page paper is included in this thesis. After acceptance the paper
had to be reduced to a 2-page summary and resubmitted. The original version is
included here because it provides more detail.
Author contributions
This paper was written entirely by Lillian Røstad.
Publication details
This paper was accepted for poster presentation at MedInfo 2007 - 12th World
Congress on Health (Medical) Informatics, Brisbane, Australia, August 2007.
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3.2.2 Paper G: Towards Dynamic Access Control for Health-
care Information Systems
Abstract
Access control is a key feature of healthcare information systems to protect the
privacy of patients and to ensure access to information as required by healthcare
professionals. A problem with many existing access control mechanisms is their
static nature. In this paper we propose combining workflow information from
medical guidelines, observations and audit logs to create dynamic access rules that
are adapted to the actual workings of a hospital. Our aim is to help minimize the
use of “break the glass” access.
Remarks
This paper is important for the thesis in that it proposes future work. Unavail-
ability of the required audit data unfortunately made it impossible to investigate
the proposed approach in further detail within the scope of this PhD project.
After the MIE conference, we have been invited to submit an extended edition of
this paper to be published in the journal Methods of information in Medicine.
Author contributions
This paper was written by Lillian Røstad and Øystein Nytrø. The main parts
of the paper were written by Røstad. Nytrø contributed to the discussion and
provided feedback.
Publication details
This paper was published in the proceedings of The XXIst International Congress
of the European Federation for Medical Informatics (MIE), IOS Press 2008, ISBN
978-1-58603-864-9. The paper was presented at MIE 2008 in Gothenburg, Sweden,
May 2008.
3.2.3 Summary of contributions
The papers in this group are related to research goal RG2 and contribution area C2
as presented in chapter 1. The first paper (F) proposes using context information
available in computerized medical guidelines to make access control more dynamic.
The limitations of this approach is that there does not exist a complete catalogue of
32 Results
computerized medical guidelines and that medical guidelines are idealized versions
of treatment processes. As seen in the work on requirements, care processes are
unpredictable and often do not conform to any standard. Also, a care process may
be very complex and involve several treatment processes.
The second paper in this group (G) outlines how several sources of contextual
information (guidelines, observations and audit logs) may be combined to be able
to predict access needs in a more dynamic, intelligent access control that is able
to learn from previous use of the system. A significant amount of work, including,
but not limited to [11], [12], [13], exists on combining access control policies and
how to refine policies. However, they all take a formalized approach to the problem
focusing on how access control policies may be specified in a formal language so
as to enable automatic combination and refinement. The approach presented here
(paper G) is different in that it is motivated from a usage-based requirements
perspective, while previous work focuses on solving a problem from a technical
and theoretical viewpoint assuming that the access policies that exist are sound
and correct.
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3.3 C3: Personally controlled health records
This section presents papers related to contribution area C3 personally controlled
health records.
3.3.1 Paper H: An Initial Model and a Discussion of Access
Control in Patient Controlled Health Records
Abstract
Health information about a patient is usually kept local to the hospital or clinic
where the patient was treated. Patient Controlled Health Records (PCHR) has
been proposed as a means to collect all this information and make it available to
the patient. In a PCHR the patient is in control and determines who gets access
to his health information. In this paper we present a set of usage scenarios to
explore the concept of a PCHR. From the scenarios we deduce a set of concerns of
relevance when designing an access control model for a PCHR. Finally we outline
an initial access control model for a PCHR.
Remarks
This paper is primarily a discussion paper and serves as background for the next
two papers on personally controlled health records.
Author contributions
This paper was written entirely by Lillian Røstad.
Publication details
This paper was published in the proceedings of The Third International Conference
on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2008), IEEE Computer Society,
ISBN 0-7695-3102-4. The paper was presented at The International Workshop
on Privacy and Assurance (WPA-2008) in conjunction with ARES in Barcelona,
Spain, March 2008.
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3.3.2 Paper I: Personalized Access Control for a Personally
Controlled Health Record
Abstract
Access control is a key feature of healthcare systems. Up until recently most health-
care information systems have been local to a healthcare facility and accessible only
to clinicians. Currently there is a move towards making health information more
accessible to patients. One means for achieving this is the Personally Controlled
Health Record (PCHR) where the patient is in charge of deciding who gets access
to the information. This poses new challenges for access control. In the PCHR
the patient is the administrator of access control. While it certainly is possible
to create roles representing people most patients would want to share with, like
primary physician, it is also likely, and desirable, to afford the patients a high level
of control and freedom to be able to create specialized access policies tailored to
their personal wishes. We entitle this personalized access control. In this paper we
present a semi-formal model for how we believe personalized access control may
be realised. The model draws on and combines properties and concepts of both
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and Discretionary Access Control (DAC) to
achieve the desired properties. Throughout the paper we use the PCHR as a
motivating example and to explain our reasoning and practical use of the model.
Remarks
This paper presents a semi-formalized model for access control in PCHRs. The
presented model addresses key aspects of access in PCHRs and explains how this
differs from traditional access control for healthcare.
Author contributions
This paper was written by Lillian Røstad and Øystein Nytrø. The main parts
of the paper were written by Røstad. Nytrø contributed to the discussion and
provided feedback.
Publication details
This paper was published in the proceedings of the 2nd ACM Computer Security
Architecture Workshop (CSAW). The paper was presented at CSAW (in conjunc-
tion with 15th ACM Conference on Computers and Communication Security) at
George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia on October 31st 2008.
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3.3.3 Paper J: Patient-Administered Access Control: a Us-
ability Study
Abstract
Patient-Controlled Health Records (PCHRs) allow patients complete control over
their health information. They decide who to share their information with, which
makes the patient the administrator of access control. While PCHRs have a great
potential for patient empowerment, they have an equally great risk for breach of
privacy if consequences of sharing are not completely clear to the patient. This pa-
per presents results from a usability evaluation study that compares three different
visual interfaces for sharing in a PCHR. The goal of this study was to investigate
how users understand and react to the concept of sharing. The study found that
when given the opportunity to do so the users wanted to exercise detailed control.
The study also indicated that defined templates for sharing in a PCHR has a lot of
authority as users assume them to be created by experts and therefore “correct”.
Remarks
This paper is included in its final version to be published by IEEE in the proceed-
ings of SECUSAB.
Publication details
This paper has been accepted for publication and will be presented at the Inter-
national Workshop and Usability (SECUSAB 2009) in conjunction with ARES
2009 taking place in Fukuoka, Japan, March 2009. The workshop proceedings is
published by IEEE.
Author contributions
This paper was written by Lillian Røstad and Ole Andreas Alsos. Alsos contributed
on study design and interpretation of results.
3.3.4 Summary of contributions
The papers in this group are related to both research goals (RG1 and RG2) and
contribution area C3 as presented in chapter 1. As such, this group of papers is
parallel to both the other groups as it incorporates both requirements and proposed
models. The papers are presented in a separate group because personally controlled
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health records, which are primarily a tool for, and controlled by, the patient is so
different from healthcare systems made for clinicians in terms of access control
requirements. The personally controlled health record (PCHR) is a relatively new
concept and previous research [14] has not focused on access control. In the context
of this thesis a model (paper I and J) has been proposed for access control in a
PCHR. However, as PCHRs are not common in use yet, the requirements basis for
this model is limited and it should be expected to evolve as PCHRs are taken into
use and more information on access control experiences and requirements becomes
available. As the viewpoint of this thesis is on access control from the user side,
it became clear that the main challenge for access control in a PCHR is how to
ensure that the patient is aware of the consequences when sharing sensitive health
data. The final paper of this thesis (J) reports on findings from a usability study
exploring patients’ reactions when faced with the opportunity to decide what to
share and with whom. The most important feedback from this study is that the
users perceived the system as having a lot of authority. If a suggestion was made
by the system for what to share, the users usually assumed that the system was
right. This implies that policies, or policy templates, for PCHRs need to be very
carefully designed.
Chapter 4
Discussion
“If you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs, it’s quite possible
you haven’t grasped the situation.”
(Jane Seabrook, www.furrylogicbooks.com)
The studies performed within this PhD project have been many and diverse, but
limited in scope and number of participants. Rather than studying access control in
healthcare in-depth from one viewpoint, several approaches have been attempted.
This has been intentional and has served the purpose of providing a broader,
more complete overview. A more focused, or narrow, approach may have led
to more detailed knowledge and results, but it would have been at the risk of not
exploring other angles that could be valuable. This discussion focuses on exploring
the validity of results presented in this thesis, based on the apparent limitations
present. Results in each of the main contribution areas are discussed with respect
to validity in terms of:
• Reliability and completeness - these terms are used to discuss confidence in
that the results are reproducible, correctly interpreted and to what extent
the results cover all relevant aspects of access control in healthcare.
• Flexibility, extensibility, scalability - these terms are often used to discuss
favorable properties of access control models. In this context flexibility of a
model means that the model adapts well to changes in e.g. the organization
that affects the premises for access control, extensibility is related to the
ability to add to the model e.g. by adding new roles or policies and scalability
is concerned with the model’s ability to adapt to changes in the size of the
user base.
• Generalizability - this term is concerned with the extent to which results
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RG1: requirements
RG2: models
C1: requirements
C2: process-based
       access control
C3: PCHR
Figure 4.1: Research goals related to contributions
from this project are also applicable in a broader context - be it a wider
range of healthcare systems or even in other domains with similar properties
as healthcare.
Figure 4.1 illustrates how the research goals are related to the contribution areas.
The goal related to discovering requirements is clearly related to the requirements
contribution area, but also to the PCHR contributions that include discussion on
requirements for a model for access control in a PCHR. The contribution areas
PCHR and process-based access control both include new, proposed models for
access control and are therefore related to research goal RG2.
Figure 4.1 shows that there is a close connection between the research goals and
contributions, as there should be and which indicates that the goals of the project
have been met. The remainder of this chapter discusses the validity of results and
contributions in more details.
4.1 C1: Requirements for access control in health-
care
Reliability and completeness
The requirements discovered within this project are by no means a complete set of
requirements for access control in healthcare. Healthcare systems are so many, and
diverse, that it is unrealistic to map even every common requirement within the
limited scope of a PhD project. However, the studies performed in this project have
the advantage of approaching the problem from several viewpoints (observation,
user experiences, traces of user actions in audit logs), supporting the claim that
the deduced requirements are reliable, and valid for healthcare as a whole, if not
necessarily complete. Compared to previous, published work, the results presented
4.2 C2: Process-based access control 39
here on access control requirements for healthcare are substantial in content and
effort.
Flexibility, extensibility and scalability
As stated, the requirements identified within this thesis is not a complete set and
therefore it is fundamental that it is possible to add onto this base. No limitations
or conditions have been placed on the requirements set.
Generalizability
Healthcare systems, and the context they need to function in, are complex and
ever-changing and at the same time have to be secure in terms of protecting privacy,
integrity and availability of data. It may be argued that healthcare as a study
subject for access control is so complex that any solutions created that works for
healthcare will have a high likelihood to also be satisfactory for other, similar,
but expectedly less complex, application domains. This is a claim however, that
though reasonable, is not verified within this thesis.
4.2 C2: Process-based access control
Reliability and completeness
The main conclusion from the requirements work is that access control for health-
care needs to be tailored to the dynamic, unpredictable care process. A suggestion
on how to do this is proposed in paper G “Towards Dynamic Access Control for
Healthcare information Systems”. However, there was not time within the project
to verify this proposed model. It is clear that the model is not complete as is, but
represents a promising starting point for future work.
Flexibility, extensibility and scalability
As the model is only described superficially, few limitations are placed on how it
may evolve. It is however, as seen from the requirements work, important in itself
that the model is flexible, extensible and scalable even in a more developed state
to be suitable for healthcare. The very problem with existing methods for access
control is their complete lack of these properties.
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Generalizability
The proposed model for process-based access control is general in some aspects
and not in others. One of the suggested information sources, medical guidelines, is
specific to healthcare and thus is not directly transferable. However, it is likely the
case that in other domains there exist other types of guidelines that can be used.
As healthcare is very unpredictable it may even be the case that in other domains
there exist guidelines that may be more usable for access control in that they are
more often applicable, and the processes are more predictable. The conceptual
model of having process-based access control using several information sources to
predict access needs should be transferable to many other domains where users
cooperate on tasks.
4.3 C3: Personally controlled health records
Reliability and completeness
Personally controlled health records are, as mentioned, a relatively new concept.
It is therefore unrealistic to believe that the requirements and models presented in
this thesis are complete. However, they are based on knowledge from the most ex-
perienced people working on PCHRs and as such should represent a good starting
point.
Flexibility, extensibility and scalability
The proposed model is based on the role-based access control (RBAC) concepts and
many attributes and features are borrowed, or extended, from RBAC. Extensibility
and scalability are among the most commonly argued attributes of RBAC. In the
proposed access control model for a PCHR these features of RBAC are reflected.
Specifically the model is designed to handle an increasing number of policies.
Generalizability
PCHR is a new, and in many aspects, a unique concept. However, it is becoming
increasingly common for people to be members of online applications containing
personal data, e.g. Facebook and PatientsLikeMe.com, where they decide what
they want to be visible to whom. The challenges and principles for access control
in a PCHR should be transferable to that of social communities on the web.
Chapter 5
Concluding remarks
“Security is the art of making sure certain things does not happen. A thankless
task, because when something doesn’t happen, there will always be someone who
claims that the security measures were exaggerated and unnecessary.”
(Salman Rushdie)
This thesis consists of a total of ten scientific papers. The papers range in focus
from requirements engineering for access control, to proposed models based on
those requirements.
This PhD project started out with a narrow focus on creating dynamic, context-
aware access control models for healthcare. Upon realizing that we did not have
the knowledge to create meaningful models the scope was widened and the focus
shifted from creating solutions to gaining a better understanding of the problem.
As a result the main contributions of this PhD project are on knowledge about how
existing access mechanisms function, what works well and what could be improved.
Studies performed in this project indicate that access control in healthcare should
be more dynamic and adaptable to be able to support the unpredictable, dynamic
and individual care process. The results suggest that a step towards dynamic access
control would be to utilize contextual knowledge, such as medical guidelines and
audit data, to allow access rules to change as the context changes.
The consequence of focusing on requirements elicitation, and taking a broad ap-
proach, is that while some access control models have been suggested they are not
complete and need more work and refinement both on the requirements as well as
on the models. Therefore directions for future work is an important contribution
from this project.
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5.1 Future work
There are two main directions for future work based on the findings presented in
this thesis: process-based access control and access control for personally controlled
health records.
Process based access control
The work on access control requirements for healthcare has resulted in a proposed
model that suggests using knowledge in the form of observations, medical guidelines
and mining of audit logs in access control. A logical next step would be to create
a more detailed model and implement a proof-of-concept that could be used for
evaluation purposes. However, before this can be done work remains on how to
extract, represent and combine this knowledge. In particular, further work should
focus on:
• Extracting usage patterns: Data mining of logs to extract usage patterns
is a non-trivial task. A precondition for performing this work is the avail-
ability of sufficiently large amounts of high-quality log data. High-quality in
this context means that the logs contain sufficiently detailed information to
construct meaningful usage patterns. Usage patterns may be simple or more
complex and may include information on location, responsibility and roles of
the present users, time and situation. It is necessary to perform research on
a large corpus of data to gain knowledge on the structure and composition
of meaningful usage patterns.
• Rules for creating permissions: That a usage pattern is common does
not necessarily mean that it should be included as an access rule. Likewise,
that an event is uncommon does not necessarily imply that it should be
disallowed. Studies and experiments should be performed to create rules for
when a usage pattern is a candidate for an access control rule.
• Misuse detection: Usage patterns may also be used to create application-
level Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for healthcare. Realizing that mech-
anisms to override access control will always exist in healthcare systems to
handle emergencies means accepting that there will always be a need for
retrospective access control. An IDS is a system that helps automate the
process of misuse detection. An IDS is either based on signatures of known
attacks, or on learning common usages. Misuse is suspected when there are
deviations from normal use, represented by the usage patterns.
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Access control for PCHRs
A model for access control in PCHRs has been proposed, but this model requires
further refinement. Also, a model is only useful if it gets implemented and eval-
uated which is the next logical step. But a correctly implemented model is not
sufficient for access control in a PCHR. Further studies should focus on:
• Usability: As the patient becomes the administrator, the usability of the
systems in the way it communicates consequences to the user is important.
Further usability studies and tests on the sharing interface and how the
users respond to that should be performed to realize the potential for patient
empowerment in a PCHR.
• Common policies: A very interesting comment made in the usability study
performed in this PhD project was on how the user perceived the authority of
any suggestions made by the system. If the system suggests an access profile
it seems likely that users will trust the system and accept that suggestion
without any closer examination. It would be interesting to confirm if this is
true and explore the consequences. Should there be common policies or not?
• Creating common policies based on the most common personal
policies: Granting users the power to create their own access profiles means
that over time we get a collection of access profiles representing who users
share with and what they share. This dataset could be used to create better
common profiles that are based on actual use rather than assumptions.
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Abstract
Healthcare personnel are dependant on access to relevant information to be able to 
provide the best possible health care for their patients. Designing access control for 
healthcare information systems is tricky, because of the dynamic nature of the 
organizations and the tasks performed. Most existing implementations solve this need 
through the use of access control exception mechanisms: if the normal access control 
mechanism won’t grant a user legitimate access it is possible to use some exception 
mechanism to gain access to required information - for example in the case of an 
emergency. This paper discusses the special needs of access control in healthcare 
information systems and presents how these needs have been solved, or attempted solved, 
based on a study of a selection of clinical healthcare systems in use that has resulted in a 
generalized access control model. Role-based access control (RBAC) is the common 
principle for designing these access control mechanisms, and this article concludes with a 
discussion on how these implementations deviate from the RBAC principle and discusses 
if RBAC is indeed sufficient to fulfill the requirements of healthcare systems or if we 
need extensions to RBAC or an entirely new access control principle.
Introduction
Access control is the process of determining which users are allowed to perform what 
operations on which objects in a computer system. Healthcare information systems 
contain sensitive information about patients that is vital in the treatment process. As such 
access control in the healthcare sector is about protecting the patient’s right to privacy, 
while ensuring that healthcare personnel get access to the right information at the right 
time in order to be able to provide the best possible treatment for their patients. 
Healthcare is one of the most information intensive sectors in the society. As more and 
more of the clinical information about a patient is recorded in information systems, it 
becomes increasingly important to have sound and sufficient mechanisms for providing 
and restricting access to this information. The old paper-based record is becoming a thing 
of the past, and as all this information about a patient is being transferred into digital and 
networked systems the risk scenario changes. Earlier, in order to gain access to 
information, one had to physically locate where the information could be found and track 
down the actual papers. Now this is only a matter of searching through a database of 
available information. Adding to this the fact that digital information can be easily 
Paper A: Access Control in Healthcare Applications 51
multiplied and transferred while papers have to be copied one by one - the potential for 
privacy breaches has definitely increased. This potential for much easier access, and also 
replication, has lead to an increased focus on information security in healthcare. Access 
control is at the heart of this focus as it is the key issue to be able to protect and make 
efficient use of this vast amount of digitally stored sensitive information.
Access control has two different dimensions that sometimes are in conflict. While the 
primary objective for applying access control is restricting access to information and 
functions, usability is an equally important feature. Access control designers need to 
understand how the organization functions as well as the access requirements of the 
system users. The result of applying too strict, or simply wrong, access control 
mechanisms will be users finding other ways of obtaining the information they need.
Access control mechanisms implemented in health care information systems today has 
not proven entirely successful on the usability aspect, namely to support the working 
procedures of healthcare personnel. As a result, they have had to rely on allowing 
exceptions from the normal access control mechanisms to be able to satisfy the needs of 
their users. From an information security point of view exceptions are bad because it 
results in loss of control over information flow. The goal of the work described here is to 
study existing mechanisms, and comparing them with the standards the claim to comply 
with, in order to gain knowledge that may help in designing an improved access control 
model for healthcare applications.
Access control implementation in healthcare applications
The information about implemented access control mechanisms presented her is based on 
a study of access control mechanisms in a variety of clinical healthcare information 
systems. Although the specific details of implementation and chosen technologies may 
differ, they all have a lot in common. These common traits can be summarized in a 
generalized access control model for healthcare that is visualized in Figure 2. This 
model, forms the basis for our discussion. Before moving on we will explain the model in 
detail.
THE GENERALIZED ACCESS CONTROL MODEL FOR 
HEALTHCARE
All the systems that have been studied have the one thing in common that they claim to 
support role-based access control (RBAC). A majority of the systems have chosen an 
approach based on the concepts of roles and responsibilities in combination with 
contextual information like place of work. The underlying assumption is that any specific 
healthcare profession has a well-defined set of responsibilities and should be able to 
perform these responsibilities for patients currently under their supervision - namely 
patients admitted to the ward that is their primary place of work. In other words role is 
equal to healthcare profession and each hospital has a list of possible roles and in each 
separate healthcare information system this role is mapped to the related permissions.
52 Paper A
Human
 Relation
(HR) System
Patient
Management
(PM) System
User
(hospital employee) Patient
owns
user profession/job
function
and place of work
Wards Professions/jobfunction
patient admitted to
registered in registered in
Healthcare
Information
(HI) System
Informationassigned
on
Permissions
(systems)
ROLE
Identity-
related
(exception)
Role-related
(normal)
Permissions
on
Figure 1 - This figure illustrates the generalized access control model for healthcare information 
systems.
This list of roles may also include non-healthcare professionals that are employed at a 
hospital, like secretaries. Information is associated with a patient, meaning that for an 
employee to have access to information about a patient in accordance with his/her role, 
the patient has to be admitted, and registered, to the ward at which he/she is currently 
employed. The information needed to construct permissions for a user is typically 
retrieved from the human-relations (HR) system that contains information about job 
position and place of work for a user, and combined with information about the patient’s 
current location in the hospital from the patient-management (PM) system. Note that 
while role and place of work are system-independent properties registered externally, the 
permissions for a role in a specific system is enforced by the system itself, utilizing this 
external information, and may vary from one system to another. Notice also that in the 
figure a role is associated with organizational-level permissions in addition to specific 
permissions within one healthcare information (HI) system. These permissions determine 
which systems users associated with this role will be able to log on to. Typically, only 
systems in this list for a particular role will be available in a customized desktop for users 
assigned to this role. One other thing worth noting is the division of system-specific 
permission in those related to role and those related directly to the user’s identity. Role-
related permissions is part of what we may call the normal access control mechanism - 
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this is supposed to handle most access requests. The exception access permissions have 
been added to deal with access in emergency and unexpected situations. Exception access 
permissions are linked directly to identity because only a small and manageable number 
of users should have this permission as allowing exceptions raises the level of risk for 
privacy breaches. We will now move on to explain the functioning of this generalized 
model in more detail through examining access control administration and the use of 
exceptions. The use of exceptions is a key issue as it illustrates the shortcomings of the 
generalized model for access control in healthcare.
 
ACCESS CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
Access control administration is about assigning and withdrawing permissions for 
authorized users. Administering access control in the generalized model for healthcare 
have two aspects: administering access rights (role, place of work, permissions) for users 
and tracking patients. There are generally five events that trigger the need for manual 
administration of access control related information: 
• Hiring a new employee.
• An employee changing job function and/or place of work.
• An employee quitting.
• A patient being admitted to a ward.
• A patient being transferred from a ward.
Access right administration today is largely a manual process governed by the filling-out, 
signing and filing of specific forms. For example, to assign permissions to a newly-hired 
employee, the manager of the ward where the employee is going to work fills out and 
signs a form stating the job function (role) and name of the ward. This form also contains 
information about assigning the user exception access rights in specific systems, if any. 
The form is then sent to the IT-department where the information is entered into the HR 
system. Through this process the user is granted access to a set of systems that are part of 
the permissions for his/her role. The information from the HR system will then be used 
by each of these systems to determine what the user should be allowed to see and do in 
each particular system. If an existing employee changes job function or place of work, 
this triggers the filling-out and filing of another form equal to the first one. At any time 
the most current form is the one used by the IT-department for entering access rights. 
This form has a from-date and a to-date, and what happens when an employee is quitting 
is that the to-date is filled in and the form re-signed. Setting the to-date in the HR system 
means deactivating access to all systems for this user. As for patient tracking, information 
about planned patient admissions are received from the patient’s primary physician and 
the date and ward of the patient’s expected arrival entered into the PM system. When the 
patient is discharged a letter summarizing the treatment and results is sent to the patient’s 
primary physician and this triggers the setting of an admission date in the PM-system. 
Setting the admission date means cutting of access to information about this patient. All 
this sounds fairly simple, even if work-consuming. However, there are some 
complications:
• A lot of the times a patient’s arrival is not planned. Patients often get admitted due to 
minor or major acute emergencies. These patients are not registered in the PM system at 
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the time treatment begins. Often, in case of minor injuries, the patient has already been 
discharged when the information is finally entered into the PM system.
• Sometimes information flow where patient’s do not, for example in the case of lab tests, 
or one doctor requesting a second opinion from another doctor.
• It is not practical to close access to information about a patient immediately when he or 
she gets discharged or transferred to another ward. As mentioned earlier there may still 
be information that need to be documented after the patient have departed - for example 
test results or notes in the patient record about treatment and observations. 
Documentation is often done, or completed, post-treatment.
• It is not practical to simply close access when an employee quits - the responsibilities of 
this employee need to be transferred to someone else first. In order to be able to handle 
these complicating situations, and other unexpected situations, the base access control 
philosophy for healthcare systems has been extended with the ability to handle exceptions 
from normal or predicted treatment and information flow. As a result, while in most 
information systems there are only two possible outcomes of an access request (granted 
or denied), in healthcare systems there are four possible outcomes:
• Normal access granted.
• Normal access denied.
• Exception access granted (normal access denied).
• Access denied.
Normal access here means the built-in access control policy of a system that is meant to 
handle most access request. When an employee has a legitimate need for access to 
information, but the normal access control mechanism denies access due to some 
complications described earlier, exception access may be utilized. However, often there 
exists information about patients that is considered extra-sensitive and that therefore even 
exception access cannot be used to access. Examples of such information are psychiatry 
records. Therefore access denied is always a possible outcome of an access request.
Access control exceptions have been added as a response to specific needs, with little 
regard to the effect on the overall access control model or policy of a system. The result 
is a generalized model that is not directly based on one access control principle, but is a 
combination of several strategies. This adds to the complexity and difficulty of having an 
overview of which users have what access rights at any given time as permissions is not 
only linked to role but also directly to identity. Exception access is powerful concept that 
may result in broad access rights and to gain knowledge about what a specific user has 
actually had access to, one need to examine each separate use of exception access. 
Understanding why exceptions are necessary is the key to understanding the 
improvement potential for access control in healthcare, and we will therefore examine 
what triggers the use of exceptions in more detail. 
ACCESS CONTROL EXCEPTIONS
Exception mechanisms were initially designed to handle access in emergency situations - 
thereby dealing with unexpected, but legitimate, access requests. Realizing that 
emergency situations do occur in healthcare, the access control designers constructed a 
mechanism to handle this called blue-light access. This permission was not related to job-
function/role, but was designed as a special permission linked directly to a specific user. 
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The reasoning for this was that only a limited number of users should be assigned this 
access, and they should be selected on a personal basis not just based on profession. It 
should also be possible to trace the use of blue light on an identity basis. Typically only a 
few persons at a ward have this permission. Blue light access was only supposed to be 
used in emergencies, when a patient arrives and there is no time for the time-consuming 
process of registering the information necessary for access control to function. But as the 
access control designers realized that blue light access may be misused, they added some 
extra security measures. The measures may vary slightly from one system to another, but 
the most common ones include:
• Requiring the user to re-enter his/her password.
• Requiring the user to provide a reason for using blue light access.
• The use of blue light access grants access only to a smaller to subset of the available 
information about a patient, not the entire patient record. To gain access to other parts of 
the record, the user has to use blue light access again.
• Enforcing time-constraints - information accessed using blue light will only remain 
accessible for the user for a short time period, defined by the organization. Re-gaining 
access requires yet another use of blue-light access.
• The use of blue light access triggers extensive auditing of the users access from that 
point on. 
The purpose of these measures is to raise the user’s awareness that the mechanism is 
indeed only meant to be used in emergency situations. Making the mechanism less easy 
to use also reduces the risk for unintended use. This is important because this mechanism 
is essentially a built-in backdoor mechanism. It can be misused. The purpose of extensive 
auditing is twofold: as a preventive measure by letting users know that all their actions 
are traceable, but also as a means of controlling and being able to detect if the mechanism 
is misused. If blue light is misused the audit logs provides the evidence needed to take the 
appropriate actions, Blue light was only intended as a mechanism for handling access in 
emergency situations. However, as pointed out in the previous section, there are a number 
of other situations where the normal access control mechanism fails. The most common 
examples are referrals, second opinions - generally un-planned treatments. And it turns 
out (surprisingly - for the developers) that a major part of treatment at a hospital is un-
planned. In fact at some hospital wards most admissions are not planned. As we have 
seen, planning is a crucial for the normal access control mechanism to function as 
patient’s need to be registered in the system, and linked to the right ward, in order for 
health care personnel to be allowed to access their information. As this is often not the 
case, there are situations when exception access needs to be used although the situation is 
not really an emergency. In some systems blue light access is used also in these 
situations. However, some other systems have constructed yet another exception access 
mechanism to be able to handle these situations. This exception access mechanism is 
quite similar to blue light access, an a lot of the same prevention and detection 
mechanism are used. The main difference is that while blue light is only meant to be used 
in specific (emergency) situation that will always occur at hospitals and need to be 
handled, the general exception mechanism was constructed to handle all access that are 
legitimate and normal from a user’s point of view, but that the normal access control 
mechanism of the system is not able to handle. Some other differences between blue light 
and the generic exception mechanism is:
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• Exception access is also assigned directly to users, not through roles, but generally 
exception access is assigned to quite a few more users than blue light access is.
• Exception access generally results in access to a broader set of information - often the 
entire patient record, and often for a longer time period than blue-light access. Blue light 
access is only meant as a temporary mechanism because the normal one takes time to 
function due to all the manual updating required. Exception access may be used in 
situations where normal access is never expected to function - like entering information 
in a patient’s record at a lab the patient never visits himself.
• As the hospitals have identified the most common reasons for using exception access, 
they have often constructed a drop-down list of common reasons, and associated time 
intervals, that the users may choose from when activating blue light access. The reason is 
to make the mechanism easier to use, which one may argue against from a security 
viewpoint but this is mainly a result of usability requirements. One may also discuss 
whether the users then will provide the correct reason, or simply the first one in the drop 
down list - or the one with the longest time interval for convenience reasons.
Constructing this exception access mechanism may be considered as admitting defeat for 
the access control designers. It was invented in a realization that the normal access 
control mechanism is not capable of handling all normal access.
CONCERNS
But is this a good, long-term solution? Shouldn’t the main/normal access control model 
be able to handle all access requests? Figure 3 illustrates the use of access control 
mechanisms in three different situations that requires the use of both normal, blue light 
and exception access. 
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Figure 2 - This figure illustrates the three kinds of access and potential for misuse related to reading 
a patient's electronic patient record (EPR).
The figure is a combination of use-case and misuse-case where the left-hand side 
represents three different situations and the right-hand side illustrates actions taken by 
doctors when reading the patient’s electronic patient record (EPR) in response to the 
situation on the left-hand side. The notation of misuse-cases is defined in (Sindre and 
Opdahl, 2005). The notation used here has some slight extensions. All white elements are 
ordinary use-case elements with their ordinary meaning. The includes-relationship means 
one use-case relying one another to perform its task. The black figures and the prevents  
and detects relationships are part of the misuse-case definition. Black elements 
symbolizes illegal or unwanted actions - in this context that means intentional illegitimate 
access by users, i.e. users accessing information without any medical reason or 
responsibility that justifies doing so. This is a potential consequence of blue-light and 
exception access that we want to avoid. The grey elements are not part of any published 
definition. They are used here to visualize the grey-zone areas of using exception access 
to perform legitimate access. As the figure shows, there is the possibility of a user (doctor 
B - the grey one) unintentionally obtaining illegitimate access. This may be due to share 
ignorance - the doctor simply does not know that what he is doing is wrong, for example 
accessing the EPR of a patient simply because he/she has heard from another doctor that 
it is an interesting case. This is not allowed according to the policy for normal access 
control that defines that there should be a relationship, in the form of a common 
organizational location, between a patient and a doctor for the doctor to be allowed 
access. The result is violating the patient’s privacy rights, the hospital policy and 
probably also the country’s laws and regulations - even if it was not deliberately. This 
illustrates how the introduction of exception access mechanisms increases the importance 
of awareness-raising measures. Responsibility for privacy-protection is shifted from the 
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system to the users. Making sure that everybody knows when exception access may and 
may not be used, and are aware of the possible penalties is an important preventive 
measure. The users need to be made aware, and reminded, of how the system is allowed 
to be used - and also what not to do. From a security point of view exceptions is a bad 
thing. Exceptions means loosing control of information flow. Exceptions mean 
unexpected behavior. Security is about having control and as such exceptions are bad. 
That said exceptions in the form of emergency access probably will always be part of 
access control for healthcare. Emergencies are a unique feature of this sector. But one 
should aim at minimizing the need for exceptions. And any required exceptions should be 
handled as part of the standard access control mechanism, to allow maximum possible 
control. It is probably not possible to not have exceptions at all - but a better suited access 
control model would minimize the need for using exceptions (leaving only emergencies).
The remainder of this paper examines if the requirements of healthcare systems discussed 
here could be implemented through an access control mechanism based solely on the 
RBAC principle, without the need for exceptions or with support for handling exceptions 
incorporated into the model, not as an add-on.
Rbac in healthcare: theory versus practice
Role-based access control (RBAC) is considered to be state of the art for access control 
in healthcare systems today as we have seen. The generalized access control model for 
healthcare presented in this paper uses a variant of roles as part of its foundation. Before 
we can compare the generalized model with RBAC we need to take a closer look at the 
RBAC principle. 
KEY CONCEPTS OF ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (RBAC)
The concept of RBAC was formalized in the paper Role-based access control (Farraiolo 
and Kuhn, 1992). The key concept in RBAC is to define roles that correspond to job titles 
and responsibilities within an organization. Each role is associated with a set of access 
rights. Employees holding the same job within an organization are assigned to the same 
role - thus the number of roles is considerably lower than the number of employees in an 
organization. As RBAC evolved from the original proposition into being implemented in 
commercial systems, the need for standardization arose. Different vendors started 
implementing RBAC in their security products, but there was no common understanding 
of what the main RBAC features are, and how they should be implemented. (Essmayr, 
Probst and Weippl, 2004) gives a thorough overview of RBAC implementation in 
commercial systems today. Having a common standard to use as a base specification is 
important to enable interoperability of the different implemented solutions. In response to 
this need the National Institute of Standards and Technology (www.nist.gov) in USA 
proposed a standard (Ferraiolo, 2001) for RBAC. The RBAC standard presents the core 
RBAC model, which encompasses the most important RBAC features. Figure 4 presents 
an overview of the core RBAC model.
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Figure 3 - Core RBAC model.
A permission is a set of allowed operations on objects. An object may be an information 
element or a Fig. 4. The core RBAC model - adapted from the NIST RBAC standard 
resource in a computerized system. A role is associated with a set of permissions. Users 
are assigned a set of (one or more) roles, and hence the access rights for one user are 
defined by the set of roles currently assigned to that user. In addition the core RBAC 
model uses the term session. The set of roles assigned to a user through the User 
Assignment (UA), defines the total set of roles a user can possibly have at any given time 
this is a static relationship. However, all of these roles are not necessarily activated at one 
single time. The relationship between users and sessions and sessions and roles indicates 
that in any given session a subset of the total possible set of roles for a user may be 
activated. That means that in a session the user may be assigned to the total number of 
possible roles for him/her, or only a subset. In addition to the core RBAC model, the 
standard defines rules for separation of duty and the concept of role hierarchies and 
inheritance relationships. The purpose of separation of duty is to enable constraint 
enforcement, and maintain role-role relationships and interdependencies. Some roles may 
contain conflicting permissions, meaning that it should not be possible for the user to be 
assigned to both roles simultaneously. For this purpose, the RBAC standard defines two 
mechanisms for separation of duty: 
• Static separation of duty (SSD) - enforces constraints on which roles may not at the 
same time be part of the static set of roles for any user.
• Dynamic separation of Duty (DSD) - enforces constraints on which roles may not be 
activated simultaneously in one session.
A role hierarchy in the RBAC standard reflects how the level of access rights corresponds 
to the level of responsibility within an organization. The roles at the top pf the hierarchy 
contain the most access right and the level of access decreases as one traverse the 
hierarchy downwards. Role hierarchies also enable the specification of role 
specialization. A specialization of a role means that one role inherits all the permissions 
of its predecessor, with added extra permissions. For example one may define a hierarchy 
where the parent role is named secretary and contains permissions to perform all the tasks 
that is normally part of a secretary’s job, and the roles secretary-sales and secretary-legal 
inherits all the permissions of the secretary role, but in addition contains permissions that 
are specific for these kinds of secretaries. 
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RBAC is considered to be suitable for healthcare as it is designed specifically for 
commercial applications serving organizations with a high number of employees, but 
relatively smaller number of job functions (”roles”) and where flexibility and scalability 
of the access control mechanism is key requirements. Why is it then that access control 
mechanisms implemented for healthcare systems, claiming to provide role-based access 
control fail? This question is investigated further in the next section by comparing the 
main shortcomings of existing access control mechanisms for healthcare identified 
earlier, with the capabilities of the core RBAC model.
Healthcare access control requirements mapped to RBAC
The main problems with the generalized access control model for healthcare is it’s 
inability to adapt to changes. The model is designed with a static basis and relies on 
manual procedures for update. In order to add flexibility exception mechanisms have 
been added. This results in shifting responsibility for information protection and privacy 
to the users of the system. The generalized access control model is centered around 
entities (users, patients, organizational units) while in fact work performed in the health 
sector is process-oriented and dynamic in its nature. The generalized access control 
model for healthcare consists of two main parts: normal and exception access. We will 
examine and compare each mechanism separately to se how or if it relates to the RBAC 
standard, before examining the possibility of combining the two in one RBAC-based 
model.
Normal access mapped to RBAC
We first compare aspects of the normal access mechanism to RBAC:
• The set of roles is flat - no hierarchy, no inheritance.
• No inter-role dependencies are defined, so separation of duty constraints specified.
• A user may only be assigned to one role. No set of roles, no activation of roles in 
sessions.
• A list of permissions is associated with each role - on a top level (permissions for access 
to systems) and in each separate system (permissions for information in a system).
To conclude the normal access control maps to RBAC in its simplest form. It does 
conform to the principle of relating roles to permissions, and users to role, thereby 
benefiting from the ease of administration due to only having to assign a pre-defined role 
to a new user instead of having to construct a new set of permissions for each user.
Exception access mapped to RBAC
Exception access in the generalized model is not realized as roles. The reason for this is 
the need to be able to restrict these permissions to small set of users, and the roles defines 
ad part of the normal access control are to few and to broad in their definition thereby 
encompassing too many users.
A generalized RBAC model for healthcare
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Keeping the key concepts and taking advantage of all the features of RBAC as defined in 
the standard (Ferraiolo, 2001), the generalized access control model based on RBAC for 
healthcare could be constructed by:
• Adding the concept of role sets - allowing a user to have multiple roles.
• Adding the concept of sessions would allow only a subset of roles to be activated in a 
session – this could be used to handle a user having several places of work. Only roles 
related to the currently active (this information could be retrieved from the roster) place 
of work would be activated in a session. 
• Role sets also enable the definition of very specific roles that is only assigned to some 
users. Instead of adding permissions directly, these users would have an extra role in their 
set for handling exceptions. This explains how the generalized model can be easily 
transformed to be entirely based on RBAC. But is this an improvement? Would it be 
perceived by users as an improved access control mechanism? Is it an improvement for 
the designers? For security people? Or should the entire model be re-designed?
Limitations of RBAC for healthcare
The main problem of the exception mechanisms in the general model is that they are used 
for handling a variety of situations. Simply mapping the exception mechanism to RBAC 
does not solve the real problem. Our goal is to minimize the need for exceptions. In short 
we need to extend the normal part of the generalized access control model to be able to 
handle situations like:
1. Unplanned admissions and transfers.
2. Post-discharge and pre-treatment access to information.
3. Referrals.
4. Second opinions.
5. Laboratory tests.
Situation number 1 and 2 are examples of processes taking unexpected turns. Handling 
this is not a matter of roles. However, contextual information (for example the current 
geographical location of a patient, or the bed he/she is in, health care personnel present 
etc.) could possibly be used in combination with roles to handle these situations. 
Contextual RBAC has been discussed in several papers (Thomas, 1997), (Georgiadis, 
Mavridis, Pangalos and Thomas, 2001), (Kumar, Karnik and Chafle, 2002), (Wilikens, 
Feriti and Masera, 2002), but some work remains on figuring out what constitutes 
relevant contextual information for access control in healthcare. Also, the main problem 
here is that healthcare is process oriented, and so should the access control mechanism 
be. Exploring process-oriented access control remains to be done. Situation number 3, 4 
and 5 on the other hand are examples of events. This could possibly be achieved through 
delegation and revocation of roles as proposed in (Na and Cheon, 2000). Delegation of 
roles is triggered by the user who delegates some of his or her permissions through 
delegating a role to another user - or possibly to another role. Revocation of delegated 
roles can be either based on a timestamp of validity, automatic when a task is completed 
or user-initiated. The use of role delegation shifts some responsibility for preserving the 
access control policy onto the system users. However, there is the possibility to place 
constraints on role delegation, to regulate which roles may be delegated to who by whom 
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thereby minimizing the probability and possibility of errors. The who and whom 
mentioned here are roles - not individual users. If an access control mechanism is based 
on RBAC all access should be based on the notion of roles to avoid unnecessary and risk-
increasing complexity.
Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have discussed requirements for access control in healthcare in relation 
to implemented access control mechanisms in existing healthcare systems. It is clear that 
the implemented mechanisms are not ideal. The strongest indication of this is the use of 
exceptions in addition to the normal access control mechanism. The implemented 
mechanisms are based on a combination of role- and identity-based access control. 
Redesigning to a pure role-based model does not immediately help minimizing the need 
for exceptions. The main problem to be solved is to move from an access control model 
based on static properties to a model that adheres to the dynamic nature of healthcare 
organizations. In other words we need to design an access control model that is process-
oriented and is able to adapt to unplanned events. This model may or may not be based 
on roles. That remains to be investigated. We intend to continue research on how to 
construct an access control model better suited for healthcare applications. To do so we 
will work on identifying and formalizing processes that should be supported, and see how 
these may be incorporated into a process-oriented access control model.
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Abstract
In healthcare, role-based access control systems are of-
ten extended with exception mechanisms to ensure access to
needed informationeven when the needs don’t follow the ex-
pected patterns. Exception mechanisms increase the threats
to patient privacy, and therefore their use should be limited
and subject to auditing. We have studied access logs from a
hospital EPR system with extensive use of exception-based
access control. We found that the uses of the exception
mechanisms were too frequent and widespread to be consid-
ered exceptions. The huge size of the log and the use of pre-
defined or uninformative reasons for access make it infeasi-
ble to audit the log for misuse. The informative reasons that
were given provided starting points for requirements on how
the usage needs should be accomplished without exception-
based access. With more structured and fine-grained log-
ging, analysis of access logs could be a very useful tool for
learning how to reduce the need for exception-based access.
1 Introduction
Security is a key concern for healthcare systems that con-
tain sensitive data, like the Electronic Patient Record (EPR).
Access control is at the heart of this concern. While health-
care personnel need access to the right information at the
right time to provide the best possible care, it is also impor-
tant to ensure patient privacy.
Over the last few years, we have seen a development in
access control research towards more dynamic, workflow-
based and user-centered models [1]. However, the state
of the art in existing healthcare systems appears to be the
traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model [2],
where roles correspond to job functions and administra-
tion is centralized. These systems are not well-suited for
handling unplanned and dynamic events like patients be-
ing transferred between wards, doctors asking for second
opinions from colleagues or simply unplanned patient ar-
rivals. Consequently most such systems have exception
mechanisms in place in addition to the normal role-based
access control for handling these situations. Use of these
exception mechanisms typically triggers additional logging
of the user’s actions. Including these mechanisms makes
the systems much more convenient to use. However, from
a security viewpoint the use of exceptions leads to added
complexity and a need to perform regular auditing to en-
sure that the mechanism is not misused. With an excep-
tion mechanism in place that allows the users to override
the normal access control mechanism, technical measures
alone cannot ensure privacy and security. This increases the
need for manual control mechanisms and awareness train-
ing for users to limit the use of the exception mechanisms.
However, studying how these access control mechanisms
are used - in what situations, to cover what needs - may
teach us something about how normal access control mech-
anisms should be changed to better suit the needs of the
users, thereby eliminating or at least minimizing the use of
exception mechanisms. Also, it is interesting to investigate
if the audit logs contain the necessary information to trace
any misuse of such exception mechanisms, or if not - what
information is lacking.
In this paper we will examine access logs from an instal-
lation of DocuLive EPR1, a system with extensive use of
exception-based access control. Doculive EPR is used by
many of the largest hospitals in Norway. We have pulled
information from the access logs from all eight hospitals in
the Central Norway Health Region (CNHR). The aim of this
work is to investigate if the audit trails may uncover infor-
mation about the real user needs that will be helpful in de-
signing better access control mechanisms for healthcare and
also to examine if the logs contain the information needed
1DocuLive is a product of Siemens Medical Solutions
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to uncover misuse. Additionally we aim to explore if any
of the principles set forward in access control research in
recent years may be applied to create better-suited access
control mechanisms for healthcare systems.
2 Related work
To our knowledge there has been no previous work pub-
lished on investigating audit trails from EPR systems to
extract access control requirements for healthcare systems.
However some work has been done on eliciting access con-
trol requirements for healthcare systems by other means.
Evered and Bo¨geholz in 2004 published a paper [3] describ-
ing how they performed a detailed case study on a small
aged-care facility in Australia that at the time of study only
used paper-based records. The study illustrates that even for
such a small example, the access control requirements are
very complex. In a short (one page) paper from 1998 [4]
Beznosov discusses requirements for access control in the
US healthcare domain and states that it should be based on
role, affiliation, location, time and relationship. It is how-
ever not clear from the one-page paper what these conclu-
sions are based on. In a classic paper [5] from 1996 R. J.
Anderson presents a general security policy model for clini-
cal information systems, which includes access control. He
bases the motivation for this policy on a number of identi-
fied threats towards healthcare systems. Based on his ex-
perience and involvement in international EPR architecture
and security standards, Blobel in 2004 [6] published a pa-
per describing a set of models for authorization and access
control in healthcare systems.
3 The subject of study
Norway is divided into five health regions: north, south,
east, west, and central. Each region has a regional health
authority and several health enterprises. Each health en-
terprise encompasses one or more hospitals, and together
the health enterprises in one region encompass all hospitals
within the region. In the Central Norway Health Region
(CNHR), which was the object of this study, there are four
health enterprises and eight hospitals. All of these hospi-
tals use DocuLive EPR. Norwegian laws prohibit sharing
of medical records between health enterprises. Medical in-
formation may be transferred based on a specific request,
but not shared in real-time, e.g. through a common EPR-
system. As Figure 1 shows there are therefore separate in-
stallations of the EPR-system for each hospital. However,
there is one common organization, CNHR IT, which is re-
sponsible for the daily operation and maintenance of the
EPR-systems for all hospitals in the region. Because they
all use the same EPR-system, DocuLive, it is possible to
extract and compare log data across hospitals.
Figure 1 also illustrates how the EPR system for one
hospital is divided into three domains: somatic, psychiatry
and child and youth psychiatry. Information in the patient
record is assigned to a domain. Domains are used to protect
information that is considered ”extra sensitive”. This means
that a user working on a ward in the somatic domain does
not have access to parts of a patient’s EPR that belong to
any of the other two domains - even if the patient currently
is at this user’s ward. Only users working in psychiatry or
child and youth psychiatry can access parts of the EPR that
are assigned to these domains.
In DocuLive access decisions are based on a user’s role
(e.g. doctor, nurse, secretary), current place of work (ward)
and the type of information being accessed. The role de-
termines which documents in the EPR a user is allowed to
access. At any given time a user has access permissions ac-
cording to his or her role for the patients that are currently
registered at the ward where he or she works. Note that a
user may be assigned to several roles and places of work. In
addition, there are two exception mechanisms for access:
• Actualization - allows a user to open the EPR of a pa-
tient that he/she does not have access to through the
normal access control mechanism. The user is granted
access to the EPR as though the patient was registered
at the ward where he/she works. The permission to
use the actualization mechanism is not part of a user’s
role, but is granted on an individual basis. When us-
ing actualization the user has to provide a reason for
doing so, and the action is recorded in a separate log
for use of actualization and emergency access. The
EPR is then opened for a specific time period, which
depends on the reason provided. In CNHR there are
currently eight predefined reasons for using actualiza-
tion which are shown in Table 1 with corresponding
time intervals. There is also the option for entering
a self-defined reason and time interval. Actualization
is also used as an automatic mechanism by the sys-
tem for opening EPRs for users who are assigned an
approval-task (signing) for documents in the EPR and
for opening the EPR of patients who are scheduled to
arrive at the hospital soon, but have not been admitted
yet. The time-period for automatic actualization is set
to 7 days.
• Emergency access - allows a user to open a single doc-
ument in a patient’s EPR that he/she does not have ac-
cess to through the normal access control mechanism.
The emergency mechanism is stricter than actualiza-
tion in that it has to be used on every single document
that the user wants to open. In CNHR only some of the
hospitals use emergency access - most make due with
only actualization. However - where in use - emer-
gency access is used to access EPR documents across
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Figure 1. EPR Hospital model
domains within one hospital. That is: some use it as a
way for users in the somatic domain to access informa-
tion in the psychiatry and child and youth psychiatry
domains. As for actualization, when using emergency
access control the user has to provide a reason and the
action is recorded in the same log as use of actualiza-
tion log. Note that there are no predefined reasons for
using emergency access; the user always has to man-
ually provide a reason. Also note that the time inter-
val where the document remains accessible after using
emergency access is firm. In CNHR this time inter-
val is set to 10 hours. Not all documents in the EPR
are accessible through emergency access, only those
specifically labeled so, and only some users have the
permission to use emergency access. Emergency ac-
cess is assigned to users much in the same way as roles
- meaning that the permission to use emergency access
is linked to a ward or hospital.
4 Methods and materials
In this study we collected access log data from the EPR-
system from all eight hospitals in CNHR for one month
(March 2006). There are two separate logs:
• Access log - every time a document is opened an en-
try is created in the access log containing information
about the user, the patient and the document being ac-
cessed.
• Actualization and emergency log - an entry is created
in this log whenever an EPR is opened using actualiza-
tion or a document is opened using emergency access.
This record also contains information about the pro-
vided reason and time interval.
Note that it is only the action of actualization or emergency
access that is recorded in a separate log. Any subsequent
use of the EPR within the time interval is recorded in the
normal access log. Therefore we had to extract and combine
information from the two logs to get a complete view of
use of EPRs within an actualization or emergency access
period.
The IT-unit in CNHR was very helpful in creating
anonymized versions of the logs - removing names of users
and patients and replacing with anonymous, but unique in-
dexes. In addition to the log-extracts, we also collected an
anonymized listing of users in the region including their as-
signed access permissions. The log-extracts we received
consisted of:
• All records:
– Anonymous user ID
– Users’s place of work - hospital and ward
– Anonymous patient ID
– Patient location - hospital and ward
• Only in records from access log:
– Time stamp
– Document ID
– Document type
– Document code
• Only in records from actualization/emergency log:
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Reason T ime(hours)
Healthcare - provide/plan/consider 48
User support 3
Research project 24
Write/complete EPR documents 48
Scan 2
Quality assurance - administrative/professional 48
Obliteration/editing/deletion/blocking/merging 1
Control committee 24
Other (self-defined) -
Table 1. Predefined reasons and time intervals for use of actualization
– Start time
– End time
– Reason
4.1 Research questions
After reviewing the type of information available, we
constructed a set of research questions to structure our
work. The questions were selected to collect information
that we hope will contribute to uncovering access control
requirements for healthcare systems. The questions we aim
to investigate and hopefully answer are:
• Q1: Is actualization/emergency access used suffi-
ciently infrequent to be considered an exception?
• Q2: Which users (role) use actualization/emergency
access the most?
• Q3: Which wards use actualization the most?
• Q4: What reasons are provided for using actualiza-
tion/emergency access?
• Q5: What kind of information is most often accessed
using actualization/emergency access?
• Q6: What information should be recorded in access
logs to be able to investigate misuse?
5 Results
5.1 Some basic numbers
Table 2 contains an overview of basic user data: how
many users in total, how many have actualization permis-
sion and how many have emergency access permission. The
table shows that out of a total of 16723 DocuLive users in
the health region, 74% have been assigned the permission
to actualize EPRs, but only 0,25% have the permission to
use emergency access. Note that emergency access is only
used by two of the hospitals in the region. The others use
only actualization.
Count %
No. users actualization perm. 12 298 74
No. users emergency access perm. 41 0.25
No. DocuLive users (total) 16 723 100
Table 2. Number of users and permissions
Count %
Actualized EPRs 54 095 54
EPRs accessed using emergency 67 0.07
Number of patients (total) 99 352 100
Table 3. Overall use of actualization
5.2 Q1: Is actualization/emergency ac-
cess used sufficiently infrequent to be
considered an exception?
As Table 3 illustrates, in March 2006 a total of 99 352
distinct patients were in contact (i.e. their EPR’s were ac-
cessed in some way) with the hospitals in the region. Of
these patients 54% had their EPR accessed using actualiza-
tion. This fact combined with the fact that 74% of all users
are assigned the permission to use actualization indicate that
use of actualization is indeed not an exception. This moti-
vates further investigations as to how actualization is used.
Emergency access is, by comparison, only used 67 times
and only very few users are assigned this permission. The
numbers are therefore so low that they are difficult to use
as a basis for any reasoning. We will therefore focus on the
use of actualization, and only return to emergency access
in the discussion - as in the true meaning of it’s name this
mechanism will probably always need to be present. How-
ever the way this mechanism is used in the hospitals in this
study, as we have explained earlier, does not really reflect
on the name emergency access.
Table 4 illustrates the proportions of use of actualization
and emergency access compared to the total number of ac-
cesses in EPR. One access corresponds to opening of one
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Count %
Accesses using actualization 297 742 17
Accesses using emergency 67 0.004
Total number of accesses 1 794 153 100
Table 4. Number of accesses in total and us-
ing actualization or emergency access
EPR or a folder or document inside an EPR. Based on these
numbers we find that 17% of the accesses are based on ac-
tualization. On average there were registered 2.31 accesses
in an EPR within one actualization period.
5.3 Q2: Which users (roles) use actualiza-
tion access the most?
Table 5 presents an overview of defined roles, number
of users assigned to this role in total, percentage of users
within each role who are assigned actualization permission,
and percentage of users within each role who have used ac-
tualization in the period. Note that we have removed the
roles where no users are assigned actualization permission,
which were a total of three roles: perfusionist, dental health
secretary and acupuncturist.
If we assume that the percentage of actualization assign-
ment for one role reflects the current perceived need or re-
quirement for use of this functionality for users within this
role (and possibly also a level of trust in users within this
role) - then it is interesting to take a closer look at the differ-
ences between actualization assignment and use. DocuLive
has been in use since 1998 (from 2002 for the entire region)
so it is reasonable to assume that the distribution of roles
and permissions are fairly stable now. We may then assume
that the percentage of use of actualization reflects the actual
needs or requirements of users within a role. If we examine
Table 5 more closely we see that on average the actual per-
centage of use of actualization is significantly lower than the
percentage of assignment of actualization. This may lead
to the interpretation that actualization is in fact assigned to
many users that do not need this functionality - at least not
on a regular basis. For instance it seems to be the rule that
all doctors should have permission to actualize - but only
52% of doctors did in fact need to do so within this period.
Of the nurses, who represent the largest group of users by
far, only 22% used actalization - while 61% has the permis-
sion to do so. Thus it would be interesting to further in-
vestigate who of these users, in what situations actually do
require the functionality provided by actualization. How-
ever the log-data does not provide sufficient information,
and would have to be supplemented with other information
- possibly from questionaires, interviews, observations etc.
Role Count %act %use
Nurse 9 234 61 22
Doctor 2 957 99 52
Health secretary 1 934 97 51
Enrolled nurse 799 31 5
Physiotherapist 411 93 52
Midwife 382 83 17
Psychologist 196 99 57
Ergonomist 150 84 38
Social worker 128 95 59
Educationist 101 96 47
Consultant 80 56 30
Social educator 79 84 28
blank/incompr. 48 75 25
Radiation therapist 34 100 44
Audiometrist 31 97 65
Radiologist 26 96 35
Speech therapist 25 80 40
Nutritionist 21 100 71
Bioengineer 16 94 6
Activator 15 67 7
Pharmacist 9 11 0
Welfare worker 9 44 11
Orthopaedy engineer 7 100 14
Dentist 7 100 14
Genetic advisor 4 100 100
Orthoptist 4 100 100
Occupational hygienist 2 100 0
Optician 2 100 100
Child welfare consultant 2 100 50
Ambulance personnel 1 100 0
Dental mechanic 1 100 100
Table 5. Overview of roles with % assigned
and use of actualization permission.
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Ward Users %act %use
Medical ward (18) 2 834 86.9 49.8
Surgical ward (21) 2150 75.2 33.2
Anaesthesia ward (8) 629 99.5 30.3
Emergency ward (10) 482 71.1 27.6
Out-patient clinics (43) 473 99.7 62.6
Table 6. Overview of users employed at ward
types with % assigned and use of actualiza-
tion permission. The number of wards of a
type is given in parentheses. Wards that were
not covered by a major type were excluded.
5.4 Q3: Which wards use actualization
the most?
From Table 6 we can see that actualization is used rather
frequently at the medical ward2. According to [7], 90-95%
of the patients who are admitted to the medical ward need
immediate help. Only 5-10% are planned patient encoun-
ters. As such, the high number of actualizations for this
ward is unsurprising. It is interesting to note that for the
surgical, anaesthesia and emergency wards the percentage
of users assigned actualization permission is significantly
higher than the percentage of actual use. Out-patient clinics
represent the wards with the highest count of actualization
use. This is probably due to the fact that patients are not ad-
mitted to these wards, they are just there for a short time in
the day, and as such it would make sense to have an access
mechanism in place to handle this.
5.5 Q4: What reasons are provided for us-
ing actualization/emergency access?
Table 7 shows that out of all uses of the actualization
functionality, a self-defined reason was only entered in 1.76
% of the cases. We investigated this number further and
found that out of all the users who had used actualization
functionality in the period only 8% had, at least one time,
provided a self-defined reason for doing so. Actualization
was used a total of 133 918 times, and a self-defined reason
was only provided in 2 357 of these actualization occur-
rences. Several reasons were provided multiple times, so
these 2 357 reasons again map to 730 unique reasons.
These numbers tell us a couple of interesting things. First
of all: the availability of predefined reasons means less spe-
cific information about why actualization was used. The
predefined reasons are so broadly defined that they convey
very little information about the user’s needs. What we can
2The medical ward mainly offers internal medicinal treatment.
see is that signing information in the EPR is a common task,
that should be included in the normal access control regime.
Although the 730 unique reasons provided are too few to
base any quantitative conclusions on, we nevertheless de-
cided to take a closer look, working from the hypotheses
that when users took the trouble to manually enter a reason
they felt that the predefined reasons did not apply to their
situation or did not describe their need accurately. If some
of these manually entered reasons are recurring then this
implies a need shared by several users. 730 entries are so
few that it was possible to examine them one by one and
attempt manual classification to see if we could create cat-
egories of recurring reasons or types of reasons. We found
that the most commonly provided reasons are:
• Out-patient clinic patient encounters.
• Physician referrals.
• Hand over patient information to other hospital/health
personnel on request.
• Request for information from a patient or next of kin.
• Release information to other external entity: insur-
ance, legal, complaints.
• Patient not registered correctly in admin system (re-
sults in access denied, even though patient is physi-
cally present at ward).
As such, these should be considered as candidates for in-
clusion in the normal access control regime and constitute
access control requirements that are not fulfilled.
5.6 Q5: What kind of information is
most often accessed using actualiza-
tion/emergency access?
Table 8 shows how the rate of actualization usage varies
with the document category. The high rate of the top entry
might be explained by the fact that it includes second opin-
ions, where the provider of the opinion might often need
access to the patient record across ward boundaries. The
same type of need could also explain the high rate of the
second entry, which covers reports from physiotherapists,
psychologists and other non-physician specialists. The rel-
atively low rate of the nursing-related entries might be due
to the fact that nurses mostly work with the patients admit-
ted to their working ward.
We also see that image-related lab results have almost
twice the actualization rate of tissue and fluid-related lab re-
sults, perhaps because specialists from other wards are often
called upon to interpret images.
With a more fine-grained and well-structured category
hierarchy, we might have been able to construct a more
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Reason %
Healthcare - provide/plan/consider 32.87
User support 0.03
Research project 1.64
Write/complete EPR documents 41.27
Scan 2.02
Quality assurance - administrative/professional 2.83
Obliteration/editing/deletion/blocking/merging 0.88
Control committee 0.11
Automatic for signing 10.33
Automatic from planned patient list 6.26
Sum predefined and automatic reasons 98.24
Manually provided, self-defined reasons 1.76
Table 7. Actualization reasons: usage in percent.
Documentcategories Totalaccesses %withactualization
External correspondence 218381 32.80
Reports from other disciplines 60431 25.81
Lab results: Image diagnostics 24438 23.64
Physician’s journal 503496 23.09
Declarations etc 13664 19.96
Summaries, not further classified 83810 18.49
Observation and treatment 22883 18.28
Lab results: Tissue and fluids 69046 13.09
Own discharge summaries 106968 12.50
Lab results: Organ function 26342 12.04
Nurses’ summaries 10688 7.81
Nurses’ documentation 482919 6.37
Other 154326 5.51
Patient orientation 12005 5.30
Table 8. Percentage of accesses performed within actualization periods, for different categories, as
classified in the EPR system. The category Other collects accesses to documents without category
or in categories with fewer than 10000 accesses.
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informative chart of actualization rates. If a decision was
made to reduce the usage of actualization, such a chart could
be used to detect the best possibilities for reduction.
5.7 Q6: What information should be
recorded in access logs to be able to
investigate misuse?
Exception access in some form will always have to be
present in healthcare systems to handle emergencies. There-
fore it is important to have sufficient and usable mechanisms
to trace any misuse.
It is clear from the work presented here that the Do-
cuLive logs do not present sufficient information to effec-
tively investigate suspicions of misuse. We had to combine
data from two separate logs and the user database to be able
to do this work, and still we believe that more information
is required. The main shortcoming is the predefined reasons
for using actualization that mask the real intent.
For an audit trail to be usable it should:
• be available through a usable interface for the admin-
istrators, and
• contain sufficiently detailed information to get a pic-
ture of what has happened.
6 Discussion
The system under study here in many ways conforms to
the ideas of optimistic security put forward in [8]. How-
ever, this study illustrates how difficult it is to trace events
in such a system. Being able to trace events is essential to
provide adequate security for systems containing sensitive
health information. Therefore we believe that healthcare
systems require a stricter form of access control, where the
usage of exceptions is minimized. Having examined the au-
dit logs we have found some recurring events fulfilled with
actualization, that should be candidates for inclusion in re-
quirements for an access control model that is better suited
for the real needs of the users. Thus this should aid in min-
imizing the use of actualization.
We would also like to point out that when exception
mechanisms are introduced, it is important to have regu-
lations on who should be assigned this permission and to
ensure that these regulations are followed. It should be easy
to obtain an overview over which users, or roles, have the
permission to use exception mechanisms. Minimizing risk
includes minimizing the user base that has the potential for
exploiting exception mechanisms.
Based on this study, we have not been able to conclude
on a firm set of requirements for access control in healthcare
systems. However, we have identified some initial require-
ments that we intend to explore further. Most of what we
have seen indicates the need for a more dynamic and user-
controlled access control solution. We believe that RBAC
should be the foundation, but with added ability for han-
dling dynamic events, workflow and collaboration. Sev-
eral papers, including [9] [10] [11] have been written on the
concept of role delegation which allows a user to delegate
his/her role to another user. This may be used as a mecha-
nism to handle referrals, second opinions and transfer of pa-
tients. To be able to do this we should introduce the notion
of health personnel-patient relationship, meaning that they
are linked by something more than just a common ward.
We also think the notion of Team-Access Control [12]
centered around a cooperating team seems promising.
Based on our findings of provided reason, we believe that
the notion of tasks and related responsibilities and duties
provides a promising platform for access control decisions
in healthcare systems.
7 Conclusion and future work
Although we have been able to identify some require-
ments, or initial requirements, in this study, more work
needs to be done. We intend to continue our investigation by
supplementing with data from other systems from the same
period (including admission/discharge dates) to see when
actualization is primarily used. In addition we hope also to
be able to observe healthcare personnel’s information needs
in situations where common tasks need to be performed.
For that purpose, interviews are another possibility we hope
to explore.
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Abstract. Misuse cases are a useful technique for eliciting and mod-
elling security requirements and threats. In addition they may be very
useful in a risk analysis process, particularly as part of the system de-
velopment process. The original misuse case notation adds inverted use
cases to model threats and inverted actors to represent attackers. How-
ever, an attack is usually performed by exploiting a vulnerability in a
system and it would be useful to be able to represent vulnerable func-
tions in a model. In addition, it should be possible to discern between
insiders and outside attackers in a model, as they have very different abil-
ities and potential for attacking a system. This paper therefore proposes
an extended misuse case notation that includes the ability to represent
vulnerabilities and the insider threat, and discusses the use of this ex-
tended notation in the system development and risk analysis processes.
1 Introduction
Security is being increasingly recognized as an important quality of IT-systems.
Much of the reason for this can be explained by the evolution of IT-systems
towards what Gary McGraw in [13] defines as the trinity of trouble: connectivity,
extensibility and complexity. While these three properties typically improves
the possibilities of what a system can do, they also significantly increases the
risks. Being secure means having control and being able to keep the bad guys
out - but the more complex a system is the harder it is to manage, and the
possibility of third-party extensions only adds to the complexity. Connectivity
is seductive as it greatly increases the potential use of a system, but it also
greatly increases the number of attackers that can have a go at breaking into
or otherwise harm the system. In some systems, like health care, defence and
banking, security has always been considered an important property. But as
the system’s operational environment changes, so does the threat scenarios and
need for defence mechanisms. Where isolation previously has been considered an
appropriate defence, this is no longer an option.
An excellent example of this, and the original motivation for the work pre-
sented here, is access control in healthcare systems. In healthcare systems pro-
tecting the patient’s privacy is a major concern - however it always has to be bal-
anced against the need for access to information to make sound medical decisions
and provide the best possible care. The current state-of-the art is Role-Based
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Access Control (RBAC) [8] and a role in existing systems is typically a rather
static structure combined of a user’s profession (doctor, nurse etc), place of work
(ward) and where the patient is currently admitted (ward). There is currently a
move towards making the systems more dynamic and user centric and enabling
information sharing. As patients are able to select hospital or place of care more
freely there is a need to be able to make a patient’s medical information available
to those providing care. This significantly adds to the complexity and changes
the requirements for the access control mechanisms - static structures are no
longer sufficient. Also, most existing systems include mechanisms that allow a
user to override the access control mechanism in emergency situations. In such
situations there is no time to register the patient at the correct ward to en-
able the normal access control mechanism to function. Emergency access control
effectively constitutes a vulnerability in the system that may be exploited by
insiders - that is; legitimate system users that may misuse the functionality. As
systems become connected the user bases grow, thereby increasing the potential
risk for exploitation.
To be able to design secure solutions in a changing threat scenario one needs
to be able to perform risk analysis [21] based on system requirements and design
[13]. UML use cases [1] have become a widely used technique for elicitation of
functional requirements [7] when designing software systems. One of the main
advantages of use cases is that they are easy to understand with only limited
introduction to the notation, and therefore are a very well-suited tool for com-
municating and discussing requirements with system stakeholders. A use case
model illustrates required usage of a system - i.e. expected functionality. In risk
analysis it is equally important how one should not be able to use a system
- i.e. potential threats and exploitation. Misuse cases [18] have been proposed
as an approach to identifying threats and required countermeasures. The nota-
tion is very simple and complements the UML use case notation. However, the
usability of the notation or the ability to give a more complete risk overview
could be significantly improved by adding some minor extensions enabling the
specification of vulnerabilities and the insider threat in misuse case models. The
remainder of this paper presents such an extended misuse case notation and
discusses potential use in system development and risk analysis.
2 Related work
The notation proposed here builds upon work done on how to utilize use cases
as a tool for eliciting and modelling security requirements. John McDermott
[11] and Chris Fox [12] used the term abuse cases in their approach where they
explored how threats and countermeasures could be expressed using the standard
UML use case notation. In their approach they kept the abuse cases in separate
models.
Later, in a series of papers [15], [16], [17], [19], [14], [18], Guttorm Sindre and
Andreas L. Opdahl have proposed, and elaborated on, the concept of misuse
cases including both graphic and textual description. Misuse cases [18] extends
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the UML use case notation by adding inverted use cases to model misuse and
inverted actors to model attackers. Sindre and Opdahl [18] define misuse cases
and misusers as:
– Misuse case - a sequence of actions, including variants, that a system or
other entity can perform, interacting with misusers of the entity and causing
harm to some stakeholder if the sequence is allowed to complete.
– Misuser - an actor that initiates misuse cases, either intentionally or inad-
vertently.
Misuse cases are created by extending a use case model and thus provide the
ability to regard system functions and possible attacks in one coherent view. In
the initial work on misuse cases two additional relationships were defined [15]:
prevents and detects and it was pointed out that the UML use case relationships
include and extend may also be used to connect misuse cases. They also pointed
out that the include-relationship may be used between a misuse case and use case
to illustrate that an attack utilizes system functionality. This in fact corresponds
to exploiting a vulnerability, but they did not provide a tailored notation for this.
Ian Alexander has written several papers discussing misuse cases as a tool [6]
[5] and experiences from application of misuse cases [2]. He has also discussed
misuse cases in relation to goal-oriented requirements engineering [3] [4]. In this
case Alexander stays true to the graphic notation of inverted use cases proposed
by Sindre and Opdahl, but he defines four different relationships: threatens,
mitigates, aggravates and conflicts with. It is interesting to note that in their
latest (at the time of writing this paper) [18] publication on misuse cases, Sindre
and Opdahl have refined the relationships in the misuse case notation adopting
threaten and mitigate as suggested by Ian Alexander. By their definition a use
case mitigates misuse case and misuse case threaten use case. Exchanging the
prevents and detects with the softer mitigate makes sense as it is unlikely that
any countermeasure applied will entirely eliminate a threat.
User Attacker
Encryptinfo
Steal infoStore private info
<<mitigate>>
<<threaten>>
Fig. 1. Simple use and misuse case illustrating the notation
Donald G. Firesmith has discussed the concept of security use cases [9] where
a security use case represents functionality needed to protect a systems assets
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from identified threats. The idea of security use cases as a way of representing
specific security functionality, or countermeasures, has been adopted by Sindre
and Opdahl [18] and linked directly to the mitigate relationships. Security uses
cases have not been given a specific graphical notation, but are represented as
ordinary use cases in the models.
Figure 1 depicts a very simple misuse case that illustrates the current nota-
tion. In this figure encrypt info is a security use case added to protect against
the threat (steal info) identified as a potential misuse case.
3 Extended misuse case notation
This paper proposes an extended misuse case notation to enable visualisation of
vulnerabilities and the insider threat. The original misuse case notation only de-
fines outside attackers [18]. However, inside attackers also pose a serious threat.
An insider, to an organisation or a system, usually has much easier access to
a system and thereby may perform other attacks and exploit other weaknesses
than an outside attacker. As such it is useful to be able to model insiders as a
separate actor type in order to get a comprehensive and complete overview of
possible threats and attacks. In the original misuse case notation misuse cases
are linked directly to use cases that they threaten. In other words attacks are
linked to system functionality that may be disabled or otherwise damaged as a
consequence of a successful attack. However it would be useful to be able to visu-
alize what vulnerabilities are exploited to perform that attack. Threats towards
a system may only be realized in an attack if the system contains vulnerabilities
that can be exploited. It is important to be able to illustrate vulnerabilities to
be able to identify all possible threats and attacks. We define an insider and a
vulnerability as:
– Insider - a misuser that is also member of an authorized group for the
entity being attacked - e.g. an authorized user of a system, a member of the
development team, an employee of an organization.
– Vulnerability - a weakness that may be exploited by misusers.
Figure 2 presents a combined overview of the notation for use cases and extended
misuse cases. In addition to actors representing insiders and misuse cases repre-
senting vulnerabilities an additional relationship exploit is defined. The exploit
relationship is used to link a threat to a vulnerability. Insiders and vulnerabilities
have been given the same grey colour in this extended notation. This choice of
colour indicates that both represent weaknesses in a system that may or may
not be exploited. Either way it is important to have knowledge about the weak
spots of a system as this constitutes the systems attack surface that may be
exploited. The remainder of this section presents examples of how to use the
extended notation. We have included three examples that illustrates different
situations and systems where the notation will be useful.
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OutsideattackerInsiderAuthorized user
Use case Vulnerability Threat
<<extend>>
<<include>>
<<exploit>> <<threaten>>
<<mitigate>>
Fig. 2. Extended misuse case legend
3.1 Examples of use of the extended notation
Emergency access control in healthcare systems Figure 3 depicts an ex-
ample misuse case model using the extended notation proposed in this paper.
The model illustrates use and misuse of the access control mechanism in an
Electronic Patient Record (EPR) system. As explained in the introduction, such
healthcare systems often have emergency access control mechanisms designed to
be able to override the standard access control mechanisms in situations where
access to information is of vital importance but there is no time to register the
patient in the system and link him/her to a specific ward - which is necessary for
the standard access control to function properly. In these situations healthcare
personnel are authorized, by their organization and the law, to use the emer-
gency access control mechanism to gain access to information that they have a
legitimate need and right to view. However, for such an emergency mechanism
to be useful, it has to be available at all times. This effectively leads to a back-
door into the system that may be misused by insiders to snoop around when
they should not. Most system users will not attempt misusing this mechanism
although it is possible. But, it is important to be able to consider the possibility
and map out potential consequences and apply proper countermeasures if the
consequences are grave. And that is the reason why this addition to the misuse
case notation is important. You cannot get a complete overview of potential
risks and threats towards a system if you do not consider the complete picture.
By identifying emergency access as a vulnerability we are also able to consider
proper countermeasuers to apply in order to minimize the risk for misuse - in
this case auditing (enables traceability and detection of misuse) and awareness
training (e.g. making sure that system users are aware of the consequences of
misuse - and what is considered misuse).
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ReadEPR
Authorized user
Insider
Access Control (AC)
Normal AC Emergency AC
<<extend>> <<extend>>
<<include>>
Unauthorized read EPR
Emergency read EPR
<<include>>
<<exploit>>
Auditing <<mitigate>>
Awareness training
<<mitigate>>
Fig. 3. Extended misuse case example: access control
User input in web-enabled systems In an IT-system all input, from users
or other systems, should be handled with caution. Figure 4 illustrates a generic
login procedure for a web application - the user has to enter a username and
password to log in. Identified attacks include (but are definitely not limited to):
– Injection - for instance sql-injections to tamper with database content or
override password check.
– Overflow - entering unexpected or large quantities of data in the input fields
to observe system reaction or possibly take control over the system.
Input validation is identified as a countermeasure that helps mitigate these
threats. This model illustrates how the extended notation helps highlight vulner-
abilites that may be exploited. An insider is not inlcuded because these attacks
are typically performed by outside attackers. Highlighting vulnearbilities in this
way may be particularly helpful in a risk analysis process, where the customers
are involved. By visualizing vulnerabilities, attacks and what may happen it will
hopefully be easier to get acceptance and resources to apply security measures.
An insider on the system development team This example illustrates
how the extended notation may be used not only on a system level, but also on
a business- or organizational level. An insider may exist inside a development
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Authorizeduser
Enter username
Enter password
Injection attack
Overflow attack
Input validation
<<exploit>>
<<exploit>>
<<exploit>>
<<exploit>>
<<mitigate>>
<<mitigate>>
Attacker
Use system
<<threaten>>
<<threaten>>
Fig. 4. Extended misuse case example: user input
team or an organization. For example a disgruntled employee working on a de-
velopment project may inject code into a system that opens up a backdoor that
attackers may exploit like Figure 5 illustrates.
Insider
System developer
Implement system
Inject backdoor
Inject bug
Code audit
Security testing
<<mitigate>>
<<mitigate>>
<<mitigate>>
<<mitigate>>
Fig. 5. Extended misuse case example: insider in development team
3.2 A step-by-step approach: how to apply the extended notation
In [15] Sindre and Opdahl propose guidelines, a set of steps, to perform when
using misuse cases to elicit threats and countermeasures. The approach described
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here for applying extended misuse cases is based on their guidelines, but refined
to include the necessary activities to consider the insider threat and uncover
vulnerabilities.
1. Identify actors and use cases for the target system. Only with an
overview of what the system is supposed to do, and who will use it, is it pos-
sible to start identifying potential attackers, weak spots and threats. Create
UML use case models. These will serve as input to the subsequent steps.
2. Identify potential outside attackers.With knowledge about the system
discovered in step 1 one should be able to identify who might target the
system for attack purposes from the outside. This may include a wide range
of persons with a wide variety of motivations - from the unskilled hacker
using downloaded tools to jam the system using a DoS1-attack, to highly
skilled industrial spies. At this point it is important to create as complete a
list as possible of potential attackers. Later, in the risk analysis process one
can eliminate attackers that are deemed unlikely or that will probably not
be able to cause any harm.
3. Identify potential insiders. As with outside attackers there may be a
variety of insiders. For example there are the people developing a system
- who may intentionally inject backdoors - and there are different kinds of
users of the operational system that have different rights and thereby differ
in the harm they are capable of inflicting on the system. On this point as
well, the main concern is to generate as complete a picture as possible.
4. Identify threats. Having identified potential misusers who may harm the
system, the next step is to identify what types of harm they may want to
inflict on the system - i.e. potential threats and attacks. To be able to do
this one should consider what might be the goal of the identified misusers -
what would they want to achieve?
5. Identify vulnerabilities. This step means analysing how threats and at-
tacks may be performed. Given the identified threats - how may an outside
attacker, or insider, do this? This means examining the systems functionality
identified in step 1 and consider each use case carefully to decide if it may be
exploited for malicious purposes. When a potential vulnerability is identified
it should be labeled accordingly in conformance with the extended misuse
case notation.
6. Identify security requirements. Having identified misusers, threats and
vulnerabilities - in this step the focus is on countermeasures. This is done
by adding security use cases (as earlier mentioned these use the notation of
ordinary use cases) to the models and adding the mitigate relationship to
the threats or vulnerabilities they protect against.
7. Revise findings so far. This is of course an iterative process that may be
carried out several times before one is satisfied that the result is reasonably
sound and complete. Creating a 100% complete overview of all risks is in-
feasible but applying a structured risk-based approach and using the right
1 Denial of Service
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people with the required knowledge [13] should help ensure the best possible
result.
Note that the steps need not necessarily always be carried out in exactly this
order. Specifically steps 2 through 5 may be intertwined as it may be hard or
possibly not beneficial to completely separate these steps.
4 Relation to risk management in system development
Risk analysis, and risk managed development processes, is a well known tech-
nique for making decisions in many engineering fields. Building secure systems
is about managing risks. It is not possible to build a system that is absolutely
secure against all attacks, known in the present or that may be invented in the
future [22]. Risk managed system development is about creating systems that
are reasonably protected against known attacks and with a robust build using
design principles that will hopefully make the system able to withstand future
attacks. What is reasonable protection and what risks should be handled is for
the system stakeholders to decide - i.e. the customer. To decide what risks to
handle one needs to rank the identified risks and this requires assigning a value.
A risk value is calculated as:
Risk = Probability × Consequence (1)
Misuse cases provide an overview of information that is very useful in a risk
analysis process [10]. However, misuse cases only provides an overview and should
be a starting point for creating attack trees [22] and doing threat modelling [20]
to get a complete view of the threats and vulnerabilities in a system. Adding
notation for expressing vulnerabilities and the insider threat makes the misuse
case notation richer and adds more detail which should provide a better starting
point for the continuing risk management process.
5 Discussion
Although not all vulnerabilities may be represented in a use case or misuse case
model, it is important when considering adding functionality to a system to
examine if it represents a vulnerability that can be exploited. Only then is it
possible to make a risk-based decision whether to not include that functional-
ity or apply the necessary countermeasures to ensure protection. The possibly
greatest power of use and misuse cases is that they are so graphical and easy to
understand, and work very well as a basis for discussion with system stakehold-
ers. Typically customers are not eager to spend money on security as it does
not directly add to the value of the product. Misuse cases can help convince
customers that security is important. Extending the misuse case notation helps
this process as it enables:
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– Visualisation of effects of adding functionality that might seem desirable,
but actually represents vulnerabilities. The extended misuse case notation
enables explicitly stating how vulnerable functions may be exploited.
– The insider threat should not be neglected. Insider attackers have very dif-
ferent possibilities from outsider attackers and by using a separate notation
for insiders one is able to emphasize this.
The extensions proposed here are simple, in accordance with the original misuse
case notation. The idea is to keep close to the UML use case notation and only
add what is needed to include security concerns, while keeping the models very
easy to understand.
6 Conclusion and further work
This paper has presented and shown examples of an extended misuse case no-
tation including notation for expressing vulnerabilities and insider attackers.
This adds to the expressiveness of misuse cases while still keeping the notation
very straightforward and easy to understand. The extended notation enables
expressing a richer and more complete picture of security threat considerations
for a system which is useful when using misuse cases in risk analysis. To fur-
ther investigate the ideas presented here, it would be useful to create a textual
representation of extended misuse cases. Also, security functionality is currently
represented as ordinary use cases. It might be useful to create a specific notation
for security functionality, or countermeasures that have been added to mitigate
vulnerabilities and threats.
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Abstract
Health care information about a patient is usually scattered  
among several clinical systems - potentially more than a hun-
dred separate systems just within one hospital. System inte-
gration and interoperability is difficult to achieve, and vari-
ous strategies for integration exist. However, one topic that  
has not  received much attention is  how to integrate system 
specific security mechanisms such as access control. This pa-
per presents the iAccess handbook, which is a tool to aid this  
process.  It  consists of a repository of reference information  
and a set of methods for collecting information and present-
ing results, and concerns the legal, organizational and tech-
nological aspects of integrated access control for health in-
formation  systems.  The  methods  have  been  applied  on two  
separate integration efforts in Norway, which affect ten hospi-
tals in total.
Keywords: 
Access to Information, Information Protection, Computer Se-
curity, Medical Records
Introduction 
Health care  information about  a  patient  is  usually  scattered 
among several clinical systems - potentially more than a hun-
dred separate systems just within one hospital. To get a clear 
understanding and overview of a patient's medical problems, 
health care personnel need access to all relevant information 
in a uniform view, but this can be difficult to achieve today. 
Therefore,  system and information integration  is  one of  the 
current key issues in health care. One topic that has not re-
ceived much attention yet is how to integrate security mecha-
nisms that  are  specific  to  each  system,  like  access  control, 
when systems are integrated. Access control and access deci-
sions are closely linked to knowledge about information in a 
system, available operations in a system and the users of the 
system. A sound and sufficient access control scheme is criti-
cal in health care systems both to protect the patient's right to 
privacy, but also to make efficient use of information. When 
information is integrated - resulting in even larger repositories 
of  information  -  enforcing  access  control  becomes  all  the 
more difficult.
In this paper we present the iAccess (Integrated Access Con-
trol for Health Care Information Systems) handbook which is 
a tool to be used during planning, designing and describing 
access control for integrated health care solutions. The hand-
book consists of a repository of reference information and a 
set of methods for collecting information and presenting re-
sults.
The methods have been applied on two separate  integration 
efforts in Norway, which affect ten hospitals in total. Due to 
confidentiality agreements, it is not possible to present direct 
results  from each  hospital,  but  we have created  generalized 
examples of results by combining findings for illustration pur-
poses. We will also discuss and share the general experiences 
from each of the applied methods. Both the feedback and re-
sults have been very positive and useful. With this paper, we 
wish to encourage similar activities in other countries based 
on the structure and methods of the handbook. 
Related work
As far as we know, little research has been done on the topic 
of access control in system integration. However, some rele-
vant work has been done on the topic of combining access 
control policies. Jajodia et al [1] introduced in 1997 the flexi-
ble authorization manager (FAM) for enforcing multiple ac-
cess control policies. In [2] Jajodia et al introduced a language 
to define decision rules to resolve conflicts among authoriza-
tions. Also relevant is the work done by Hu et al and Ferraiolo 
et al on using what they call a Policy Machine (PM) [3,4]. The 
PM is a standardized access control mechanism that should re-
quire changes only in its configuration to be able to enforce 
different  access  control  policies.  They claim that the PM is 
also  able  to  support  combinations  of  policy  instances  e.g. 
Role-Based Access Control and Multi-Level security. In addi-
tion the work of Siewe et al [5] is of interest. They have creat-
ed a language, Interval Temporal Logic (ITL),  which allows 
for  formal  specification  of  access  control  policies  and  can 
handle  the  enforcement  of  multiple  policies  through  policy 
combination. The potential for specification of temporal de-
pendencies in access control rules using ITL is of particular 
relevance for health care as a collaborative and dynamic envi-
ronment.
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The iAccess handbook
The purpose of the iAccess handbook is to serve as a collec-
tion of information and methods that are useful and appropri-
ate  when  integrating  the  access  control  of  heterogeneous 
health care information systems. The handbook itself is web-
based,  and  both  readable  and  editable  for  registered  users, 
such as people from health care organizations, researchers and 
students (doctoral fellows primarily). The handbook has been 
created using the free MediaWiki software package1,  which 
allows easy publication and development of content in a col-
laborative setting. The following sections will briefly explain 
the main contents from each of the three parts of the hand-
book.
Handbook part 1: Reference information
For the reference part of the iAccess handbook, we have bor-
rowed the concept of viewpoints from the software architec-
ture field - specifically from IEEE 1471-2000 Recommended  
Practice for Architectural  Description of Software-Intensive  
Systems [6]. We have defined three viewpoints; legal, organi-
zational  and  technical.  These  viewpoints  were  selected  in 
recognition of the fact that access control is not merely a tech-
nical issue. Organizational measures are important in enforc-
ing access control and ensuring patient privacy.  The legisla-
tion defines if, how and when sharing of sensitive health infor-
mation can take place.
Legal viewpoint
This viewpoint  gives  an overview of relevant paragraphs in 
the Norwegian legislation, a dictionary of legal terms from the 
selected texts and definitions of legal terms that are used but 
not formally defined in the legal texts. The purpose of the def-
initions of terms is to create a common basis and understand-
ing when discussing legal issues and possible interpretations 
of regulations. It is not so much the legal texts themselves, but 
rather the current interpretation of them, that limits sharing of 
health  information.  The  handbook  makes  this  information 
available to people who need to understand these rules,  but 
who do not necessarily have any formal juridical background. 
The information has been grouped into six categories for easy 
lookup and cross-linking:
• Limitations on managing health information.
• Orders, permissions and conditions regarding sending, 
receiving and exchange health information.
• Information quality.
• Ensuring confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
health information.
• Internal control.
• Particular technical, physical or organizational require-
ments for managing health information.
1 MediaWiki is a free software wiki package originally written for 
Wikipedia, see http://www.mediawiki.org.
Organizational viewpoint
This viewpoint concentrates on the organizational aspects that 
influence access control. The goal is to give an overview of 
how an organization and different work processes can influ-
ence access to health care information.
Aspects related to system purpose are organized as follows:
• The users of the system: Some systems are used only 
by some individuals while others are used by all hospi-
tal employees.
• How the system is used: Different systems are used in 
different ways; e.g. for reading or writing, in emergen-
cies, for a long or short period of time.
• Type of patient treatment in relation to the system: Pa-
tients can be treated by one fixed health care profes-
sional, by a fixed group, a dynamic group or by every-
one on a ward, to name a few alternatives.
Aspects related to the organization are organized in this way:
• Written policies related to access control and informa-
tion security behavior.
• Informal policies: This is what is considered acceptable 
behavior among colleagues, and will not always be the 
same as what is stated in the written policies.
• Acceptable risk: A health care organization will always 
be subject to risk requirements, both from the authori-
ties and the general public. 
• Relevant organizational measures, e.g. routines, aware-
ness-building and training.
Technical viewpoint
This viewpoint contains information that is closely related to 
the technical concepts of access control. No assumptions are 
made about the prior technical knowledge of the users of the 
handbook, and this section has a twofold purpose; providing 
users that are newcomers to the field with sufficient informa-
tion to get an overall grasp of access control concepts, models 
and mechanisms; and equally important, provide a structure of 
properties of access control models and mechanisms that can 
be used for classification of systems. The information is struc-
tured as follows:
• Reference models: Definition and description of differ-
ent access control models, such as discretionary or 
mandatory [7], role-based [8], task-based [9], team-
based [10] and domain-based [8].
• Access control regimes: Systems can have no access 
control at all, it can be an integral part of the system or 
access control can be enforced by some entity external 
to the system itself.
• Attributes that can be used for access control decisions: 
Group [11], role, ward affiliation, physical location, 
time/shift, relation to information owner (patient), se-
curity clearance level.
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• Dependency on other systems: The access control 
mechanism in a system can e.g. depend on information 
from other systems, like a user database or human-rela-
tions system, for making access control decisions. 
• Additional measures: These are not a direct part of the 
access control mechanism, but can provide information 
that allows detection of misuse. Examples are logging 
and surveillance.
Handbook part 2: Survey methods
This part  of the handbook defines  a set of survey methods, 
and we will here briefly present the main ones and discuss our 
experiences with them. 
Study of documentation
From studying documentation you can learn a lot about an or-
ganization and/or a system that will be useful when working 
with access control  integration, and also for planning work-
shops and interviews (see the following sections). There are 
certain kinds of documentation with relevance for access con-
trol,  which should be present  in a health care  organization, 
and we recommend focusing on the following:
• Organizational information security policies.
• Organizational structure - including roles and responsi-
bilities for information security.
• Organization-level access control policy.
• Strategies - for instance integration strategy.
• High-level system documentation.
• Description of implementation and use of access con-
trol mechanisms.
• Requirements with respect to identification, authentica-
tion and authorization.
• Risk analysis based on system security and patient 
safety.
Different organizations have different types of documentation. 
The results from a documentation study greatly depend on the 
organizations studied. It can be just as interesting to see what 
kind of documentation exists, as to study the actual content. If 
the anticipated documentation does not exist, asking for it still 
serves a purpose by making the organization aware of what 
information could be expected to be present. 
Our experiences were that a lot of the information that actual-
ly  existed  was  outdated.  As  systems  develop  and  routines 
change,  documentation  is  not  always  updated  accordingly. 
Also,  information can be scattered  across  many documents, 
with varying level of details and target groups, making it diffi-
cult to get a clear understanding and overview. 
In  many cases,  system documentation was considered to be 
sensitive, and some organizations were reluctant to give that 
kind of information. Specifically,  this was a concern for the 
systems that the organizations had designed and built them-
selves to fit their needs.
Process workshops
Our process workshop is based on the methodology defined 
by Dingsøyr et al in [12]. The purpose of the process work-
shop is to get input from a heterogeneous group of people that 
are involved in a given process. In other words: While docu-
mentation can  provide  information  about  how something is 
supposed to be done - the process workshop conveys informa-
tion about how it is actually done. 
During a process workshop, the participants are presented a 
scenario, and then each one writes down keywords related to 
activities, participating roles, documentation and tools that are 
used to solve the scenario. This is done in the same way as a 
traditional  brainstorming  session.  After  this,  the  workshop 
participants  gather  around  a  process  map  and 
eliminate/add/reorganize the notes on the map until they have 
reached a version of the process description that they can all 
agree upon, as shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 - Creating the process map by using sticky notes and  
active discussions.
According to the participants, the process maps give a correct 
and clear view of the real-life situation; that is how things are 
done, conflicting elements and possible improvements.  Dur-
ing the workshops, the participants raise and answer questions 
such as: What is done, why it is done like this, why not like 
this, what can be improved and what is most important.  
The maps are useful as basis for discussion, and give insight 
into something that is scattered throughout the organization in 
documents, intranet pages and people's knowledge. A typical 
two-hour workshop will usually result  in high-level  process 
descriptions, and seldom detailed technical information about 
the access control mechanisms.
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Semi-structured interviews
Semi-structured interviews [13] are used to gather detailed in-
formation to complement and elaborate  the process  descrip-
tions obtained in the workshops. This is be done by using a set 
of  pre-defined  questions  (an  interview guide),  but  allowing 
the interviewees to answer freely - there are no categories to 
select from and the interviewees are allowed to ask questions. 
An interview guide should start by explaining the interview 
motivation, and briefly explain the relevant terms. The inter-
view guide should be based on the process maps.
We found it valuable to be able to interview end-users with 
different professions and from different wards. The challenges 
related to physicians are not necessarily the same challenges 
as those experienced by nurses, who have other experiences 
than secretaries. The access control solution should consider 
this.
In most cases, the experiences of the end-users coincided with 
the  opinions  of  the  decision  makers  and  system 
developers/maintainers,  but  they  also  disagreed  on  several 
matters, for instance on routine efficiency.  The interviewees 
talked a lot about physical access to computers and login rou-
tines, while workshop participants concentrated more on size 
of logs and details related to the possibilities of better techni-
cal solutions. At the end of the interviews we asked the partic-
ipants  how  they  felt  about  being  interviewed  about  access 
control related issues. The response was only positive. Some 
said that they had never really thought about access to infor-
mation before, others said that they were glad to be able to tell 
someone about their experiences with getting access to infor-
mation, and hoped that things would be better in the future.
Handbook part 3: Combining and presenting results
This  part  of  the  handbook  describes  how  to  combine  and 
present the results from the survey methods. The most promis-
ing technique is the use of an extended version of UML2 ac-
tivity diagrams for modeling the process descriptions and in-
formation related to processes. An UML activity diagrams is 
well suited for describing processes and activities, both related 
to human and system behavior, because of a visual organiza-
tion that is easily understandable by most people. An example 
activity diagram can be found in Figure 2, which describes as-
signing access rights to a newly employed person. In this dia-
gram, the activities are organized in swim lanes, depending on 
who has the main responsibility for performing the activity. 
Shadowed boxes represent documentation relevant for the de-
scribed  activities.  Attached  to  the  activities  are  also  other 
types of comments. Four such stereotypes have been defined, 
two of which are shown in the example diagram. These are: 
<<challenge>>, <<suggestion for improvement>>, <<user ex-
perience>> and <<elaboration>>.
We have found that the extended UML activity diagrams rep-
resent  the combined findings of the surveys  in a very clear 
way.  It  is easy to get  a grasp of  the overall  process,  at  the 
same time as more detailed information is readily available. 
However, keep in mind that if too many comments are added, 
the diagrams may become messy and incomprehensible. Bal-
ancing the detail of information and ease of understanding is 
both a science and an art.
2 The Unified Modeling Language, see http://www.uml.org
Local sysadmUser (employee) Central 
administrator
Head of department
Send letter containing 
username and password
Order UserId 
and systems access
Sign contracts
Fill in access 
rights forms
Assign access 
rights to user
for local/department -
specific systems
Check health care 
personnel authorisation
Identify access needs 
based on responsibilities
Assign access 
rights to user for 
centralized systems
Create UserId
<<documentation>>
Forms: access rights centralized
systems, access rights
local/department -specific systems
<<documentation >>
Contracts: declaration of
confidentiality, terms of
use for IT-systems
Workshop Interview
<<elaboration >>
The user has to be authorized
for access to the hospital network
and assigned access rights to 
each relevant clinical system. 
<<challenge>>
Only one person is
responsible for this .
Figure 2 - Sample UML activity diagram including documentation and comments from interviews showing the process of as-
signing access rights to a new employee.
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General discussion
The original reason for creating the iAccess handbook was to 
have an instrument for  surveying  and documenting real-life 
access  control  integration  efforts  of  health  care  systems  in 
Norway.  The  results  so  far  have  mainly  been  used  by  the 
health care organizations themselves and by doctoral fellows 
researching how technical, legal and organization challenges 
should be solved. A survey gives a snapshot of today’s situa-
tion, what has improved from the past and what is planned in 
the near and distant future. Just as interesting, some improve-
ments may be negative for the majority of the users, and it is 
important to share that kind of information with the rest of the 
community in order to avoid reoccurrence. 
There exists a myriad of clinical health care systems in most 
hospitals today. Systems that individually are not very suitable 
will  probably not  be improved  by integration,  and  the way 
systems are used in real-life must be properly examined. It is 
our firm belief that research on legal, organizational and tech-
nical  matters  will  be important  to achieve  integrated  access 
control solutions that actually fit the context in which they are 
used, and in the end – improve health care while protecting 
the privacy of the patient.
Conclusion
We have presented the iAccess handbook, which consists of 
three parts relevant for analyzing planned or existing efforts 
for access control integration for health care systems. Repre-
senting multiple  views from various  stakeholders  in unified 
diagrams eases the understanding on how things are and what 
should be done. The methods in this paper are first and fore-
most qualitative, and our future work will add methods that 
provide more quantitative results. 
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Abstract
Health information about a patient is usually scattered
among several clinical systems, which limits the availabil-
ity of the information. Integration of the most central sys-
tems is a possible solution to this problem. In this paper we
present one such integration effort, with a focus on how ac-
cess control is handled in the integrated system. Although
this effort has not yet solved all the issues of access control
integration, it demonstrates a practical approach for creat-
ing something that works today and serves as input to the
discussion on future challenges for access control when in-
tegrating multiple systems.
1 Introduction
In order to ensure patient safety, rapid access to rele-
vant, correct and consistent health information is crucial for
healthcare personnel in many situations. Even though elec-
tronic patient records (EPR) are becoming more and more
prevalent, the patient information is usually scattered over
several clinical systems since the clinical information is lo-
cal or specific to wards. A patient may easily have hundreds
of separate, overlapping records in various systems. This
limits the availability of the information.
A typical solution to this problem is integration of the
most central clinical systems, such as the laboratory, X-ray
and EPR systems. However, it is vitally important that the
advantages of information integration are not achieved at
the sacrifice of patient privacy. Access control is therefore
one of the key issues to handle in order to be able to success-
fully merge and make efficient use of these large quantities
of information. Information flow between systems should
not compromise the access control rules for the information
in any of the systems, and this can be a challenge to achieve
if not properly planned and implemented.
In this paper we describe an ongoing integration effort
at a Norwegian hospital, with a focus on the implemented
access control strategy. This effort serves as background
for a discussion of unresolved matters for access control in
integrated healthcare systems.
2 Rikshospitalet and the Clinical Portal
Rikshospitalet University Hospital1, founded in 1826,
represents the highest level of specialist care in Norway and
is one of the largest Norwegian hospitals. The hospital has
about 4000 employees including 500 medical doctors and
1500 nurses. Each year the hospital handels 160 000 out-
patient clinic consultations and 50 000 patients are hospi-
talized for one day or more. A myriad of IT systems of
varying age and technological sophistication are used in the
everyday treatment of patients. They estimate that a total
of approximately 160 clinical systems exists and are in use
at the hospital. At Rikshospitalet they recognize the need
to integrate these systems to make better use of the clinical
information. Access to all relevant information about a pa-
tient should aid healthcare personnel in providing the best
possible treatment for their patients.
Rikshospitalet has chosen an integration approach based
on a web portal solution called the Clinical Portal . Through
1Rikshospitalet (http://www.rikshospitalet.no)
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this portal they are currently able to provide integrated ac-
cess to information from the following systems: PiMS/PAS
(patient administrative information), DocuLive (EPR sys-
tem), RIS-Web (Radiology), Symphathy (Pathology), Mi-
clis (Microbiology) and NetLab (Clinical biochemistry, Im-
munology and Pharmacology).
The Clinical Portal offers three different desktops to its
users:
• My desktop: Provides access to e-mail, calendar, con-
tacts, and general news from the hospital.
• Clinical desktop: Provides access to information on
activities at the user’s ward and is the entrance point
to all clinical information in the hospital. Through the
clinical desktop one can get access to an overview of
all patients belonging to one’s own ward, and search
for patients not currently admitted to this ward.
• Patient desktop: Provides access to information on a
specific patient, e.g. lab results, orders made (e.g. for
new test) and plans. It is also possible to create new
orders for this patient.
3 Research Methods
Our goal in the case study was to gather as much infor-
mation as possible about the clinical portal: technical in-
formation about the system itself, about the decisions and
choices made when implementing the system, the reason-
ing behind these decisions, and experiences from use of the
system so far. To be able to grasp both technical and ad-
ministrative information, as well as user experiences, the
following methods were chosen for our study:
• Documentation study: Two different types of docu-
ments were studied: Written policies and routines, and
documentation of IT systems that play an important
part in enforcing access control.
• Process workshops: Two creative workshops were ar-
ranged, focusing on different aspects of how access
control are handled in the organization and in the IT
systems. The workshops were directed towards two
different focus groups: Decision makers and system
developers/maintainers. The methods used during the
workshops were based on [2].
• Semi-structured interviews: Interviews were con-
ducted with clinical personnel (e.g. physicians, nurses,
nutritionists) and administrative personnel (e.g. secre-
taries), to get information on how the current access
control scheme influences their work day. Interviews
were performed in accordance with [1].
The results obtained from using these methods were
combined in UML activity diagrams, slightly adapted for
this purpose. For more information on the methods used,
see [3].
4 Case Study Results: The Clinical Portal
and Access Control
In this section the Clinical Portal is described, from a
technical, administrative and user perspective. The focus
will be on the access control solution. We begin this section
by introducing the overall architecture of the clinical portal.
4.1 System Architecture
Figure 1 shows the overall architecture of the Clinical
Portal. The architecture is founded on the middleware plat-
form J2EE. We have attempted to keep the layer descrip-
tions on a level of detail sufficient for our discussion of ac-
cess control in the clinical portal, without getting into too
much detail.
• The Portal Layer: The portal layer is the interface
to the users. Portlets2 handle the users’ requests, and
interacts with the service layer.
• The Service Layer: The service layer provides ser-
vices for accessing merged information from the
source systems either from the Operational Data
Store (ODS) which contains merged information from
source systems, or by talking to the Hub which con-
nects the source systems.
• Integration Layer: The integration layer handles
communication between applications and systems.
This layer consists of the Hub and a set of adapters that
facilitates communication with each source system. To
avoid direct changes in the source systems, the individ-
ual source systems’ data formats are used for fetching
and storing data. The data is translated to XML-format
by the adapter and transferred from the source systems
to the clinical portal. The ODS is also part of the inte-
gration layer. The Data Warehouse (DW) contains his-
torical data from the ODS and source systems, and is
used to facilitate report generation. Also part of the in-
tegration layer is the MetaCatalogue and the OID (Or-
acle Internet Directory) which is the basis for access
control in the clinical portal. We will discuss these in
more detail next.
• The Source System Layer: This layer consists of the
source systems feeding data into the clinical portal.
2Java based Web component.
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Figure 1. Architecture
4.2 Access Control in the Clinical Portal
4.2.1 Accessing the Main Portal
Figure 2 presents the overall security architecture of the
Clinical Portal with a focus on access control. As can bee
seen from the figure, access to the portal is role-based. A
user gets a different view of the portal depending on his/her
role as defined in the MetaCatalogue (an LDAP-server that
is part of the Meta directory). A role consists of a user’s
profession (nurse, doctor etc) and place of work (depart-
ment, ward). The role also determines information from
which source systems are avilable and also which patients
(e.g. only those currently admitted to the ward where tue
user is working).
In additon to pure roles, Rikshospitalet has adopted the
concept of actualization in the portal. Actualization is a
mechanism defined by Siemens Medical in their DocuLive
EPR system. Briefly explained, actualization is an excep-
tion mechanism that allows a user to ovverride the role-
based access control and gain access to information about
a patient. This mechanism is intended for use in situations
where there is a user-patient contact that is not known to
the MetaCatalogue and therefore access is denied based on
roles. Examples of situations where actualization is used
include referrals or second opinions, situations when the
patient is moved from one ward to another and the Meta-
Catalogue is not updated when the patient arrives, a patient
not currently hospitalized calling in to ask questions about
previous treatment and so on. In DocuLive a user has to
provide a reason for using actualization, and this triggers
extensive logging of the users actions. The Clinical Portal
adopts this approach and additionally requires the user to
re-enter his/her password when using actualization.
The Clinical Portal offers context-based login, meaning
that the users return to the context from which they last
logged out. In addition, the portal has a fixed login time,
meaning that users are logged out if they have not been ac-
tive for the last 30 minutes.
Users authenticate themselves to the portal by present-
ing a username and password. The MetaCatalogue does not
contain any information on the passwords of users. The
association between usernames and passwords are found in
the OID, which is the second LDAP server, and it is only the
OID that is involved in authentication. The MetaCatalogue
and the OID are continuously synchronized.
4.2.2 Accessing Subsystems
The Clinical Portal pulls information from six different sub-
systems. Access to the subsystems are handled by the por-
tal, meaning that the portal stores the username and pass-
word and forwards these to gain access to information form
the differen subsystems. This procedure is enabled by the
fact that at Rikshospitalet all users have the same username
and password to the Clinical Portal and the six subsystems.
This is a first step towards Single Sign-On for all systems
at Rikshospitalet. However, for now, this solution requires
manual maintenance of identical username/password-pairs
in the different systems.
What information is made available is left up to the sub-
systems to determine. In other words the Clinical Portal
simply logs a user onto a subsystems and requests informa-
tion through an adapter. The subsystem returnes informa-
tion allowed for this user according to the system’s own,
internal access rules and returns these to the adapter, who
wraps the information in XML and forwards to the Clinical
Portal. It processes the information received, from several
subsystems, and presents in to the user in a unified fashion.
4.3 Access Control Administration
It is not only the technological solutions that influence
how well an access control solution will work in an organi-
zation. In the process workshops we therefore also consid-
ered the administrative view of the solution, with a special
focus on two issues:
• Assigning access rights to a new employee.
• Detection of misuse of the actualization access mech-
anism.
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Figure 2. Security architecture
We focused on capturing information about formal and in-
formal procedures, who were involved in the operations per-
formed, and what documentation was used.
4.3.1 Assigning Access Rights to a New Employee
Figure 3 illustrates how a new employee is assigned ac-
cess rights to all relevant systems. This process involves
quite a lot of people from different parts of the hospital.
Key components are the paper based access rights assign-
ment forms. There is one form that states which systems a
user should have access to - in other words which systems
should show up on the desktop when the user logs on the
hospital network. Additionally there is a separate form for
assigning access to the main electronic record system (Do-
cuLive), which has a rather complex access control solution.
The ward leader is responsible for completing these forms
and issuing them to the technical staff. Sometimes the user
participates in this process, and sometimes office personnel
assist the ward leader. The user also has to sign a confiden-
tiality agreement and read and accept the rules for use of
the hospital’s IT systems. This is a step to ensure security
awareness among users.
The access forms are sent to the IT-department which
takes care of the practical issues involved in assigning ac-
cess. Some of the systems may have separate administra-
tors, and in these cases the central IT-department forwards
the task of access rights assignment for these systems to
them.
4.3.2 Detection of Misuse
Figure 4 depicts the process of discovering and handling
misuse. Misuse is not detected automatically, nor are there
routines in place for regular auditing of the actualizaton logs
from the EPR-system. However, sometimes the logs are
checked based on suspicion presented by someone, or pos-
sibly motivated by the fact that a highly public figure or
celebrity has been hospitalized. If the information found in
the logs provide grounds for suspicion of misuse of a pa-
tient’s record, this is discussed with the patient’s primary
physician to uncover if it is indeed misuse. The hospital has
procedures in place for handling these kinds of incidents.
This includes for the ward leader to consider punitive ac-
tions in cases of detected misuse.
4.4 Clinical Portal: User Experiences
When introducing a new solution one should always fo-
cus attention on user experiences. So far we have only
inerviewed a small set of clinical users (only 7), but they
did provide some interesting feedback that we have sum-
marized here.
4.4.1 General Experiences with Access Control in the
Clinical Portal
Users have experienced that access to information can be
cumbersome when systems are not integrated. All users
have stories about how they had to log on and off systems
several times to get what they want. They are therefore
satisfied with the Clinical Portal, where information from
several systems is presented together. Most users can only
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Figure 3. Assigning access rights
think of things that have improved after the introduction of
the portal, including access control, the amount of informa-
tion available electronically and the way the information is
presented to the users. When it comes to the access control
mechanisms and challenges, the one thing users really react
to is that they are, as they put it, ”thrown out of the systems”
after some limited time.
Integration of systems results in more information being
available at the same time, something that may result in in-
formation overflow if the information is not presented in a
good and flexible way. However only very few users indi-
cate that they sometimes get too much information. Another
issue is patient privacy, but no one thinks it is a problem that
they get too much information from a patient privacy point
of view, though this is an issue they have given little thought
before. They feel that this is taken care of by the system,
since the most sensitive information can be blocked. They
also feel that availability of information is for the patients’
own best - it is needed to provide the best care for the pa-
tients.
When users are asked which factors should control what
information you are allowed to access, many users men-
tion position and place of work, and the patients they are
working with. This corresponds well with the factors that
are used today - role and ward. Other factors that are men-
tioned are the needs of the patients and care givers. Strict
access control should not reduce service to the patient and
the effectiveness and quality the provided care.
The use of actualization is not problematic for users.
They are not uncertain of their right to access patient records
using this mechanism. Actualization is perceived as neces-
sary and a natural part of their work, though some com-
ment that it could be sensible to have some limitations as
to which patients one is allowed to actualize. Finding these
limitations is however not easy.
Misuse of access to information, and misuse of actualiza-
tion in particular, is not a problem, according to the users.
Their typical workday is very busy, and there is no time
for accessing patient records that are not needed. They are
also well aware that access to patient records and the use
of actualization is registered in logs. Some of the users
have rather high expectations as to what is detected when
it comes to misuse. One user even said that if you access a
patient record by mistake, you could call the IT-department
and say that it was a mistake. Another said that they think
the system registers misuse if it recurs.
But though misuse is not experienced as a problem, users
are generally acknowledging that checking for and prevent-
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Figure 4. Detection of misuse
ing misuse of information is an important task, and they
think it is important that someone in the hospital is working
with this.
5 Discussion and Future Challenges
The Clinical Portal represents a step towards integration
of clinical systems. However, in the existing portal the ac-
cess control mechanisms remains unintegrated. A separate
access control mechanism has been created for the portal,
and the source systems use their own access control to ex-
tract information for a given user.
This approach works for now, but it is desireable to be
able to develop a more closely integradet solution in the fu-
ture. However this is certainly not trivial. Access control
is closely tied to information. The more fine-grained the
access control mechanism is, the more closely it depends
on knowledge about information and structure of data. A
completely different approach would be to integrate infor-
mation from all six subsystems, creating an access control
scheme tailored to this ”new” system. However, this ap-
proach requires an enormous intial effort to integrate infor-
mation from all subsystems and create a new interface to
the information. Other disadvantages includes scalability -
it would not be straightforward to include information from
more systems without considerable effort. Backwards com-
patibility and historical data is also problematic. It is impor-
tant to have access to historical clinical information about a
patient, so all existing data would have to be incorporated
in the new system.
Also, the access control models may differ considerably
between the different source systems. Though many sys-
tems may use role-based access control, the concept of a
role may be very differently defined. Some systems may be
using simpler access control models where access is based
on e.g. a user’s clearance level and/or information category.
Some systems may not have any access control at all - if
you provide a valide username/password pair you gain ac-
cess to all information and functions in the system. Some
work has been done on the combination of different access
control policies, e.g. in the policy machine [4][5] but there
is still a lot of work that remains to be done on this topic.
A key question is if it is even feasible to do or if one should
settle for an approach like the one in the Clinical Portal.
Another issue worth discussing is the increased risks re-
lated to information exposurer and patient privacy in an in-
tegrated system. The more information is made available
through one system, the greater is the risk of serious conse-
quences if security is compromised. This concern is taken
very seriously by the Norwegia government; the result be-
ing that sharing of clinical information between hospitals
belonging to different organizations is not allowed in Nor-
way.
This leads us to a general discussion of what type of ac-
cess control model is suitable and sufficiently secure for
healthcare systems. As risks related to information expo-
sure increases, so does the need for an access control mech-
anism that is sound and precise: which is able to provide
healthcare personnell with the required information at the
required time - no more and no less. important that is should
be no less than required either. The previously mentioned
actiualization mechanism is a direct result of the inability
of the main access control mechanism to fulfill the users
information requirements. Actualization is supposed to be
an exception. A study of use of this mechanism in the Do-
cuLive EPR system at 8 Norwegian Hospitals showed that
74% of the 16 723 registered DocuLive users were assigned
the permission to use actualization. The study also showed
that 54% of the patients had had their EPR accessed using
actualization. In fact 17% of all accesses to EPRs were per-
formed using actualization. Based on these numbers use
of actualization can hardly be consideres an exception, it is
in regular use. Allowing use of this mechanism in an in-
tegrated solution is probably not a good idea. We should
rather strive towards creating an access control model, that
is suited for the user’s real needs. The more information is
included in a healthcare information system, the greater the
risk for exposure and need for appropriate protection.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
The shift towards integration and interoperability of clin-
ical systems will continue. In the future inter-hospital inte-
gration will also become an issue. Information integration
and accessibility offers potentially great benefits for health-
care personnel and patients, but it also greatly increases the
risks for patient privacy. As such it is important to focus on
sound security mechanisms for authentication, access con-
trol and auditing in integrated systems. Even though Rik-
shospitalet, in their approach so far, has taken some steps
towards integration, the issue of access control integration
still remains largely unresolved.
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Abstract  
Controlling access to information is a key concern in health-
care systems. Some form of Role-Based Access Control 
(RBAC) is implemented in most healthcare systems. A prob-
lem with existing RBAC models used in healthcare is their 
static nature which doesn’t capture the dynamic needs of 
healthcare providers. In this paper we propose an enhanced 
access control mode combining RBAC with the use of Medical 
Guidelines, MG-RBAC. Medical guidelines contain temporal 
and contextual information that may be used to make more 
informed, dynamic access control decisions.   
Keywords: 
Access to Information, Computer Security, Privacy 
Introduction 
Access control is a key concern in healthcare systems. In or-
der to ensure privacy of patient data, the systems has to pro-
vide suitable mechanisms to control access to information. 
Access control in healthcare has two rather different perspec-
tives:  
• at the one hand privacy protection and ensuring that 
no one gets access to more information than they 
need, and 
• at the other hand patient safety and making sure that 
healthcare personnel gets access to all information 
they need to provide the best possible healthcare.  
Many existing healthcare systems use some form of Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC). Access decisions are typically 
based on a user’s role (e.g. nurse, medical doctor etc) and 
workplace (department, ward). A user is granted access ac-
cording to his/her role’s permissions for patients that are ad-
mitted the ward where he/she is working. 
However, these static properties are often incapable of captur-
ing the dynamic needs of healthcare personnel. Patients are 
transferred and moved more rapid than the systems are up-
dated, resulting in incorrect information forming the basis for 
incorrect access decisions. To work around these issues, most 
healthcare systems provide exception mechanisms that allow 
users to override the access control when they consider their 
information needs to be legitimate, even if the system thinks 
otherwise. Using these mechanisms typically requires provid-
ing a reason, maybe re-enter your password, and triggers ex-
tensive logging of the user’s actions. These mechanisms are 
only supposed to be used in a minority of situations – thereby 
the name exception mechanisms. However, a study of usage 
of one such system [1] for one month at eight hospitals in 
Norway shows that: 
• 74% of the users were assigned the permission to use 
this exception access mechanism 
• the exception access mechanism was used on the 
EPR of 54% of the patients during this period 
• in fact 17% of all EPR-accesses were performed us-
ing the exception access mechanism. 
Looking at these numbers it is clear that usage of this mecha-
nism is in fact not an exception but a common event. This 
implies that there are situations commonly occurring that 
should be included in the normal access control mechanism, 
so the exception mechanism could be left for actual excep-
tions. The study concludes that there is a need for an access 
control model for healthcare that is able to handle dynamic 
events and support workflow and collaborations. 
In this paper, present a model for using Medical Guidelines 
(MG) as a source of information for access control decisions 
as a way of creating more dynamic access control for health-
care.  
MGs (or clinical practice guidelines) are defined by [2] as: 
“Practice guidelines are systematically developed statements 
to assist practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate 
health care for specific circumstances.” 
In other words an MG for a given diagnose contain informa-
tion about best-practice course of treatment developed by ex-
perts in the field. Guidelines may exist both as an informal 
collection of information and in a more formalized, structured 
manner. There exist several formalized notations for com-
puter-interpretable MGs. MGs may include temporal and 
event information that implies information needs and there-
fore may be used in access control.  
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The next section of this paper provides background informa-
tion on RBAC and computer-interpretable MGs necessary for 
the discussion of MG-RBAC. We then move on to some mo-
tivating examples explaining how information form MGs may 
be used for access control. Finally, the general MG-RBAC 
model is presented before we move on to discussion of poten-
tial use, conclusion and our plans for future work on taking 
MG-RBAC from an idea and a model to testing it out.  
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
RBAC [3] has become widely popular over the last decade. 
RBAC is based on the concept of assigning permissions to 
roles and roles to users. Roles often correspond to positions in 
an organization. In other words a role represents the permis-
sions needed to perform the responsibilities of a specific posi-
tion. RBAC has become so popular because of it’s: 
• Simplicity and ease of administration – there are 
relatively few roles in an organization compared to 
the number of users. With RBAC a role has to be de-
fined only one time and can be assigned to many us-
ers.  
• Flexibility – changing responsibilities for a job posi-
tion only requires updating permissions for one role, 
and the update is reflected for all users assigned to 
that role.  
• Scalability – as the organization grows the number 
of roles may remain unchanged if there are no new 
positions. New roles may easily be created and as-
signed to users as needed. 
 
RBAC has been implemented in many commercial systems. 
Therefore an RBAC-standard [4] has been created to ensure 
that the main principles remain equal across different imple-
mentations. The RBAC standard includes the core RBAC 
model as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1- Core RBAC 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how a role is linked to permissions 
(PRMS). A permission set consists of a set of allowed opera-
tions (OPS) on objects (OBS). The Core RBAC model also 
illustrates that users are assigned to roles either through a 
static or dynamic (session) link. Through these links the user 
has a constant set of roles through the static link, and a poten-
tial set of roles through the dynamic/session link. Any subset 
of the roles assigned through the dynamic link may be acti-
vated at any given time through a session. 
The RBAC standard additionally defines the notion of role 
hierarchies and permission inheritance, and static (SSD) and 
dynamic (DSD) separation of duty. Static separation of duty 
places constraint on the assignment of users to role. Dynamic 
separation of duty places constraints on the activation of roles 
in a given session.   
Computer-Interpretable Medical Guidelines 
Studies [5] have shown that MGs may be effectively used for 
computer-based decision support – aiding clinicians in making 
the best decisions. There exist a number of different formats 
for computer-interpretable MGs and they have several com-
mon properties [6] including the organization of treatment 
plans in decisions and action tasks. A key feature is also the 
possibility of directly linking the MGs with patient data which 
enable patient-specific decision support. 
 
Asbru [7] is only one example of such an MG specification 
language, and many of the others available may be used for 
informed access control decisions. Asbru has been chosen as 
the notational example used in this paper because it contains 
constructs for defining periodic and event-triggered clinical 
tasks that suits our demonstration needs, and because Asbru 
MGs are encoded in XML (eXtensible Markup Language1) 
which is a widely used format for exchange of data.  
The Asbru Language 
Asbru is a time-oriented, intention-based, skeletal plan-
specification representation language [8]. A skeletal plan 
specified in Asbru consists of a name and a plan body and 
may additionally contain (optional): a set of arguments, a time 
annotation, preferences, intentions, conditions and effects. 
The plan body contains a set of plans (child plans) and infor-
mation about how/in which order these plans should be exe-
cuted and also conditions on which child plans must be com-
pleted in order to complete the parent plan. 
An Example MG in Asbru 
An example of use of Asbru for encoding a guideline for 
treatment and observation of Gestational Diabetes Mellitus 
(GDM – a form of diabetes found in pregnant women) is avai-
lable at [8]. Use of the guideline is initiated if a glucose toler-
ance test in the third trimester shows a blood sugar level be-
tween 140 and 200 mg/dl. The guideline consists of three 
main parts: 
• Glucose monitoring: measurements performed by the 
patient herself and/or by the physician. Check to ver-
ify that glucose level kept below a limit of 130 mg/dl 
for 1-hour post meals, < 100 mg/dl fasting and 
preprandial. 
• Nutrition: treatment is based on teaching patient a di-
et. The goal is to manage GDM with diet and without 
insulin therapy for as long as possible. Regular fol-
low-ups (every 1-4 weeks) are recommended and 
should be scheduled individually for each patient. 
• Insulin therapy: initiated if blood sugar consistently > 
100 mg/dl fasting and/or one hour postprandial con-
                                                          
1 http://www.w3.org/XML/ 
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sistently higher that 130 mg/dl and attempts at diet 
modification has failed.   
Note that this is only a short excerpt of the information con-
tained in the guideline.  
MG-RBAC 
The Asbru guideline for GDM contains both temporal and 
contextual information that may be used for access control: 
• Periodic information needs: visits to physician while 
under treatment every 1-4 weeks (specific value set 
for a patient). The EPR does not need to be accessi-
ble to the physician in-between visits. 
• Events that trigger information needs: when blood 
sugar readings are too high the patient needs to visit 
her physician and review treatment. The EPR should 
be made accessible to the physician when too high 
readings occur.  
 
Motivation – examples of use 
A set of UML use cases have been created to illustrate the 
envisioned use of medical guidelines in access control for 
healthcare systems. 
 
First of all a guideline has to be selected for treatment based 
on a diagnosis as shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2 - Guideline selection 
In the GDM example the condition for diagnose and guideline 
selection was a blood sugar measurement of 14-200 mg/dl. A 
guideline contains generalized treatment advice, and has to be 
tailored by the physician to treatment of this specific patient. 
 
One example of such tailoring is the periodic consultations 
that are part of the guideline for GDM. The advice in the 
guideline only states that there should be regular consultations 
every 1-4 weeks. A specific time interval has to be selected 
for a specific patient – e.g. every 4 weeks. From a privacy 
viewpoint it is desirable to limit accessibility to the patient’s 
EPR as much as possible. Even if the physician is regularly 
seeing the patient he/she does not need access to the EPR at 
all times. The physician might need to prepare for an ap-
pointment and enter some information after the appointment, 
but it should be sufficient for the EPR to be accessible to the 
physician e.g. two days prior to and two days past the next 
scheduled visit for a patient. Figure 3 illustrates how this may 
be done. The physician will have an assigned role that in-
cludes permissions to this patient’s EPR as he has a responsi-
bility for this patient. But the role providing access rights do 
not need to be activated at all times as explained in the section 
on the Core RBAC model. The doctor should receive an alert, 
through role membership, that the EPR has been made avail-
able.   
 
Figure 3 - Guideline: periodic access 
 
The third example of use of guideline information for access 
control decisions is the occurrence of events that trigger in-
formation needs. A typical example of such an event is a 
measurement of some sorts, made manually or by a sensor, 
which triggers further actions. For the GDM example the glu-
cose monitoring illustrates such an event. The patient is to 
measure her own blood sugar level 4 times a day. If the meas-
ured level is above some specified limit further action needs to 
be taken. To determine further actions the physician needs 
access to the patient’s EPR. Figure 4 illustrates how roles are 
activated if the guideline specifies that a measure results in an 
action that requires access to the EPR and the relevant role (or 
roles) is activated. 
 
Patient Perform
measurements
Physician
Enter result into
EPR system
Evaluate against
guideline limits
<<System>>
Determine actions
Activate/deactivate
roles for access to EPR
<<System>>
<<System>>
Alert Roles
<<System>>
Access Event
 
Figure 4 - Guideline: event trigger 
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 The MG-RBAC Model 
Using these examples of use as input a preliminary MG-
RBAC model, shown in Figure 5, has been created, showing 
in a bit more detail how this would work in a system. 
 
 
Figure 5 - The MG-RBAC model 
 
A Guideline Monitor would be responsible for receiving 
events like sensor data or manual measurements and track 
time for the next periodic event. When a triggered or periodic 
event occurs the Guideline Monitor would request that the 
Access Control Monitor activates the appropriate roles. The 
Access Control Monitor would then be responsible for alert-
ing the users assigned these roles and for evaluation of subse-
quent access request.  
Discussion 
The model presented here for MG-RBAC is only very pre-
liminary and serves to inform about a promising idea that re-
quires further work. 
The examples presented are based on a guideline representa-
tion in the Asbru language. Certainly for such a model to be 
useful it should be able to use guidelines in many different 
notations. One possible solution would be to integrate a guide-
line translation engine in the Guideline Monitor module. 
Work remains as to examine in details information contained 
in other guideline specification languages and how they may 
be translated. 
The examples presented here only illustrate triggered and pe-
riodic events. There may be additional information contained 
in guidelines that could be utilized in access control, but this 
has not been fully explored yet. 
Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper we have presented an idea and a preliminary 
model for using medical guidelines as input to access control. 
The idea is that guidelines contain information that can assist 
in creating a dynamic and context aware access control model 
for healthcare. 
We intend to continue to explore this idea further by creating 
a more detailed model and developing a proof-of-concept im-
plementation. 
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Abstract. Access control is a key feature of healthcare information systems to 
protect the privacy of patients and to ensure access to information as required by 
healthcare professionals. A problem with many existing access control 
mechanisms is their static nature. In this paper we propose combining workflow 
information from medical guidelines, observations and audit logs to create 
dynamic access rules that are adapted to the actual workings of a hospital. Our aim 
is to help minimize the use of “break the glass” access. 
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Introduction 
Access control is one of the key features of health care systems. Access control is 
about restricting as well as ensuring access to information. These are two inherently 
different viewpoints. For privacy it is important that access is only granted when there 
is a legitimate need. For availability it is equally (some would argue more) important 
that access is granted to all information required to provide the best possible care. The 
goal of the work presented here is to narrow the gap between these viewpoints, by 
proposing a method for dynamic access control rules that adheres to the actual flow of 
work and responsibilities in a hospital setting.  
1. Access Control Concepts 
Access control is about enforcing rules on which operations a user is allowed to 
perform on a resource (eg. information) in a system. There are several different access 
control models. The most common ones are mandatory access control (MAC), 
discretionary access control (DAC), and role-based access control (RBAC) [1]. RBAC 
is the preferred model used in many implemented access control mechanisms in health 
care systems and serves as the foundation for the ideas presented here. 
1.1.Role Based Access Control 
The concept of Role Based Access Control [1] has gained increasing popularity over 
the last decade. In RBAC a set of roles is created that corresponds to job functions in 
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an organisation. Each role consists of a set of access rules. Rather than assigning access 
rules directly to a user, a user is linked to the role and thus has all the access rules 
associated with that role. Several users may be assigned to the same role, and one user 
may take more than one role. A typical RBAC role in a health care system would be 
that of a nurse. The nurse role consists of access rules that correspond to the 
information access a nurse needs to perform his job. 
The main advantages of RBAC are ease of administration, flexibility, and 
scalability.  RBAC is considered a good fit when there are considerably fewer roles 
than employees in an organisation. When a new nurse is hired there is no need to create 
a specific access profile for him – he can simply be assigned to the existing nurse role. 
This scales well as it is easy to add more nurses as an organisation grows, and it is 
flexible because changing the access rules for all nurses only requires changing one 
role. 
Some health care systems [2] combine a role with the user’s place of work to make 
access decisions. In short, this means that a nurse only has access to users that are 
currently admitted to the ward where he works. Dynamic RBAC is extended to assign 
roles temporarily, according to work shifts or work processes. 
1.2.Optimistic security 
In [3] Povey proposes the concept of optimistic security. The key feature in an 
optimistic security mechanism is the use of retrospective control. There are no access 
rules that are enforced when a request is made. The concept relies on the ability of 
someone to examine the logs later and determine if the access was legitimate. Auditing 
and traceability therefore are keys to enforcing optimistic security. Povey argues that 
optimistic security is well suited for systems such as healthcare where there may be 
situations when a user needs to exceed his normal privileges. 
Optimistic security exists in many healthcare systems as a “break the glass” 
mechanism intended to be used in emergency situations. A study [2] has looked into 
use of the “break the glass” mechanism in a system where normal access control is 
enforced as a combination of role and workplace as explained earlier. In the study audit 
data was collected for one month’s use of the system at eight hospitals. The study 
found that 54% of the patients admitted in this time period had their record accessed 
using the “break the glass” mechanism. Out of all accesses made in this period, 17% 
were performed using the “break the glass” mechanism. These findings strongly 
suggest that the rather static approach to access rules (role and ward) does not perform 
very well in a dynamic hospital setting.  
The 17% accesses resulted in almost 300 000 entries in the audit logs. The study 
also found that there were no automatic audit analysis tools in place. The amount of 
audit trails and the absence of tools make the task of analyzing audit trails for 
retrospective control impossible. A condition for optimistic security to work, is that the 
amount of use is minimal so manual review is realistic. 
In health care there will always be situations where availability of information is 
crucial and “break the glass” mechanisms are needed. One example is emergency 
situations when there is no time to properly register the patient in the administrative 
systems, which often is a requirement for normal access rules to apply. The goal is 
therefore not to completely eliminate the use of “break the glass”, but to reduce the use 
to an amount where it is feasible to perform retrospective control. One approach 
towards this goal is developing access control mechanisms that are better adapted to the 
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actual workings of a hospital and are dynamic in the sense that they are able to change 
and adapt as situation and context change. We will explore this idea further in this 
paper.  
1.3.Dynamic access control – related work 
As stated earlier, a problem with many access control rules in health care is the “define 
once – use always” approach and the lack of dynamic properties and adaptability. 
Several extensions to RBAC have been proposed to include dynamic properties. 
Examples include role delegation [4] and context-sensitivity [5]. Role delegation 
allows a user to delegate her role to another user to transfer responsibilities either 
permanently or time-limited. In the proposed context-sensitive RBAC models, context 
is used to activate and deactivate roles. A user may have a large pool of assigned roles 
and only a subset of these may be activated at any given time. Context properties may 
be used to regulate the activation of a role. E.g info about work schedule may be used 
to activate roles depending on time and place of work.  
Though some propositions have been made on how to make RBAC more dynamic, 
a discussion of exactly what properties or values may be used remains. In the 
remainder of this paper we propose combining established best practices (medical 
guidelines), collected observational data, and audit data to learn patterns of information 
used in healthcare and apply these patterns to create access control rules that will help 
minimise use of «break the glass» access.  
2. Workflow knowledge 
Medical guidelines, work plans, observed behaviour, and audit data all contain 
information about workflow in healthcare. While medical guidelines are the idealised 
version of the medical activities related to a problem, observational and audit data 
reflects what actually happens [6]. Moreover, guidelines do seldom assign roles or 
resources. However, by combining theses sources of knowledge we can create a 
coherent view of enacted workflows in healthcare, with an emphasis on information 
access requirements that may be utilized for access control. 
In this section we discuss medical guidelines, observation data and audit logs 
separately and provide motivational examples of how this information may be used for 
access control purposes.  
2.1.Medical Guidelines 
A medical guideline (MG) for a given diagnosis contains information about best 
practice course of treatment developed by experts in the field. Guidelines may exist 
both as an informal collection of information and in a more formalised, structured 
manner. MGs often include temporal and event information that implies information 
needs that may be utilized for access control purposes. 
An example of a guideline for treatment and observation of Gestational Diabetes 
Mellitus (GDM – a form of diabetes found in pregnant women), encoded in the Asbru 
language for computer-interpretable medical guidelines, is available at [7]. Use of the 
guideline is initiated if a glucose tolerance test in the third trimester shows a blood 
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sugar level between 140 and 200 mg/dl. The guideline consists of three main parts: 
glucose monitoring, nutrition, and insulin therapy.  
The Asbru guideline for GDM contains both temporal and contextual information 
that may be used for access control: 
• Periodic information needs: visits to physician while under treatment every 1-
4 weeks (specific value set for a patient). The EPR does not need to be 
accessible to the physician in-between visits. 
• Events that trigger information needs: when blood sugar readings are too high 
the patient needs to visit her physician and review treatment. The patient 
record should be made accessible to the physician when too high readings 
occur.  
2.2.Observational data – empirical grounding of guidelines 
Guidelines are constructed by experts and represent idealized treatment processes – 
what is expected to happen given a diagnosis. In reality, each patient and care process 
is unique; furthermore, a complex problem will require that different guidelines are 
combined. A guideline may serve as a starting point, but will often need to be adapted 
to the specific situation at hand. In [6] the authors discussed how to use methodical 
observations of clinical care situations to improve guideline implementation.  
An observational study was carried out in the summer of 2005. Two medical 
students observed clinicians at work in the pre-rounds meeting and ward rounds. They 
took detailed notes of who were present, the subject of discussion (patient), information 
sources (written/electronic and oral), and specifics about what type of information was 
used. In each observation session they followed one clinician and from her viewpoint 
they noted who else were present and what role they had in the situation. We have 
reviewed these data to construct an example of how observational data may be used to 
create patterns of information\needs, shown in Figure 1.  
Due to space limitations, Figure 1 shows only the first few interactions in the pre-
visit meeting, but it is sufficient to serve our purpose as an illustrative example. In this 
case they are discussing patient NN. The patient is new to the doctor so the nurse fills 
him in on some background info. Several information sources are used – some are 
paper-based (the patient list and the patient chart) and some are computer-based 
information systems (the electronic patient record (EPR) and the radiology imaging 
system (IDS)). The figure illustrates communicative acts between the actors present 
and the actors and the information sources they use. Roles are used to label the actors. 
This figure illustrates how observation may be used to uncover information needs in 
specific situations with a specific diagnosis (in this case heart failure), and link these to 
roles. Though not shown in Figure 1, the observational data shows that the diagnosis 
changes as test are being done and test results received and reviewed, as is very 
common. Through observational studies we can examine these transitions and study 
transfer of responsibilities and access requirements related to this. 
 
   
122 Paper G
 
Figure 1 – Information needs in pre-rounds meeting 
Even if observations provide real-world examples that may be collected over time, 
generalized, and used to improve guidelines, they still only give us a relatively high-
level view. To complete this picture and get detailed and accurate information about 
information accessed and actions performed, we turn to the audit logs. 
2.3.Usage patterns from audit logs 
Most health care systems keep complete history; of changes in information and of user 
actions. The purpose is to always be able to roll back to a previous state, and to have 
complete traceability. This means that there exist audit logs with very detailed traces of 
user actions: the user's role at the time, what information was accessed, for which 
patient and what actions were performed [2]. From these audit logs it is possible to 
create generalized usage patterns per role. If a system allows “break the glass” access, 
it is also common to require the user to provide a reason for doing so and keep a log of 
these reasons as well [2]. We suggest utilizing this information for access control by: 
 1. Examine the reasons for using “break the glass” – any reasons that occur often 
should be considered as candidates for inclusion in the access control rule set. 
 2. Look for common usage patterns that describe workflows inwards. Examples 
include: 
  Temporal patterns 
If action X occurs – then action Y occurs within Z time. 
  Responsibility patterns 
If action X is performed by Role A – then action Y is performed by role B. 
  Location patterns 
If action X is performed at ward 1 – then action Y is performed at ward 2. 
  Situation patterns 
 Role X is in situation S in a guideline, and requires specific information. 
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3. Discussion 
“Break the glass” access is necessary to handle unexpected situations, but it constitutes 
a security risk and may be misused. The ideas presented here aim at minimizing the 
need for glass-breaking and making retrospective control feasible.  
In access control, the main concern is privacy, where access should only be 
granted to the information required by an actor in any situation. Clinicians may well 
disagree with this from the viewpoint that it is better to have broad access. In this paper 
we therefore suggest an approach to access control that combines guidelines and 
learning from observations and logs. The goal is to take another step towards the goal 
of having access mechanisms that support the work of care providers, while protecting 
the privacy of patients. 
The approach presented here is not another “do once – use forever approach”. It is 
fundamental to this idea that observing, learning, and improving should be a 
continuous process, allowing access rules to adapt to a dynamic, ever-changing 
environment. 
4. Conclusion and future work 
In any clinical situation, the information about a patient can be ordered along a 
continuum from highly relevant, via interesting, to irrelevant, and at the other extreme; 
illegal according to laws of privacy. Being able to sort correctly may mean life and 
death. The main problem facing today’s busy clinician is avoiding irrelevant 
information and at the same time getting access to relevant information. In this 
perspective, relevance ranking and access control depend on the same knowledge about 
situation, role, guideline, and care process. We believe that optimistic access control, 
based on analysis and learning from practice as intended and as enacted, is a first step 
towards both effective relevance ranking and optimal access control. 
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Abstract
Health information about a patient is usually kept local
to the hospital or clinic where the patient was treated. Pa-
tient Controlled Health Records (PCHR) has been proposed
as a means to collect all this information and make it avail-
able to the patient. In a PCHR the patient is in control and
determines who gets access to his health information. In
this paper we present a set of usage scenarios to explore
the concept of a PCHR. From the scenarios we deduce a
set of concerns of relevance when designing an access con-
trol model for a PCHR. Finally we outline an initial access
control model for a PCHR.
1 Introduction
Improved information technology is seen by many [1]
[2] as the best means of making health care delivery more
consistent, comprehensive, safe and timely. Accurate and
complete medical records are a prerequisite to this vision.
Health information about a patient is usually kept in local
systems, specific to a ward or clinic, and accessible only to
health care personnel. For every point of care there are sep-
arate systems to record information, and information flow
between systems is very limited. Even if the information
is immobile, the patient is not. As a consequence, patients
often find themselves having to retell their medical history
and redo tests whenever they encounter a new health care
provider.
Personal Health Records (PHR) have been proposed as a
potential solution to this problem. The Markle Foundation,
a public-private organization, in a report from their Con-
necting Health care in the Information Age Project defines
PHR as follows:
”An electronic application through which individ-
uals can access, manage and share their health in-
formation, and that of others for whom they are
authorized, in a private, secure, and confidential
environment.” [3]
As pointed out by [4] this definition is a good starting point,
but more information is needed on the context and use of
PHRs. A PHR, in its most common current form, is a web-
based system where a patient can enter notes and informa-
tion about his health condition and share this information
with his health care providers. Some PHRs also import
clinical information and make this accessible to the patient
through the system. However, most PHRs are local and spe-
cific to one point of care [5], or to a set of care sites that sub-
scribe to the same PHR from one software vendor. As such,
most existing PHRs only provide the patient with limited
insight into parts of his health care information.
The goal of a Patient Controlled Health Record (PCHR)
[6] is to assemble the patient’s complete health history and
grant the patient control over who gets access to this infor-
mation. A PCHR differs from the usual PHR in that it ex-
ists outside of organizational boundaries. A PCHR contains
data from multiple care sites, and the patient is in complete
control of the information. This means that it is the pa-
tient himself who is administrator and assigns access rights
to grant other users access to his information. Through a
PCHR the patient may choose to share his data with health
care providers and family members. He may also use the
PCHR to release part of his health information for research
studies or public health purposes.
PCHRs provide a technology that may address several
common problems in health care and health information ex-
change but, as a technology, they present some new chal-
lenges. Developing an approach to supporting access con-
trols that corresponds to the dual needs for protecting pa-
tient privacy and autonomy (on the one hand) while pre-
serving a high degree of flexibility so that the real variation
in the conditions and circumstances of patients is served is
the main challenge.
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The remainder of this paper explores in detail the con-
cept of a PCHR focusing on how it may be used for sharing
and what this means for access control. From this discus-
sion we deduce a set of concerns that need to be included
in an access control model. Based on these concerns we
outline an initial access control model for a PCHR. We con-
clude by summarizing what future work is needed on the
topic.
2 Related work
The main concepts of Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) is introduces in this section as it is fundamental the
initial model. Much of the background for he discussion
in this paper comes from the Indivo1 PCHR system. Work
on this system has been ongoing for years, and the author
of this paper was fortunate enough to get to work with the
Indivo team to study PCHRs and the issues related to this
system. In this section we briefly describe the Indivo sys-
tem with a focus on the current access control model. The
information presented in this section serves as a basis for
further discussion in the remainder of this paper.
2.1 Role-Based Access Control
Role-Based Access Control(RBAC) [7] has become one
of the most common access control models, and is by
many [8] [9] [10] [11] considered particularly well-suited
for health care systems. RBAC is based on the concept
of assigning permissions to roles and roles to users. Roles
often correspond to positions in an organization. In other
words a role represents the permissions needed to perform
the responsibilities of a specific position. The access pro-
files mentioned in the previous section on Indivo may be
considered to represent roles in the system. RBAC has be-
come so popular because of its:
• Simplicity and ease of administration. There are rel-
atively few roles in an organization compared to the
number of users. With RBAC a role has to be defined
only one time and can be assigned to many users.
• Flexibility. Changing responsibilities for a job position
only requires updating permissions for one role, and
the update is reflected for all users assigned to that role.
• Scalability. As the organization grows the number of
roles may remain unchanged if there are no new posi-
tions. New roles may easily be created and assigned to
users as needed.
1http://indivohealth.org
RBAC has been implemented in many commercial systems.
Therefore an RBAC-standard [12] has been created to en-
sure that the main principles remain equal across different
implementations.
2.2 The Indivo PCHR
The architecture of the Indivo (formerly PING) PCHR
system was outlined in [13]. Key features of Indivo are:
• The patient is in complete control and in charge of de-
termining who gets access to his information.
• Information is imported into Indivo from clinical sys-
tems and made available to the patient.
• The Indivo code is open source and available for any-
one to download and customize or adapt to their needs.
• Public health surveys may be deployed through Indivo
and the patient given the option to participate.
2.2.1 Access Control in Indivo
When a user is registered in Indivo he is given a role (re-
searcher, patient or provider) that is used to restrict func-
tionality that is available to the user in the system. For
example only an administrator may create new users. In
addition to this, access profiles are used to set permissions
when a user is sharing his record with another user. The cur-
rent implementation presents the patient with a set of pre-
defined access-profiles to choose from when sharing. An
access profile is a set of permissions. Assigning an access
profile to a user means granting this user all the permissions
included in the profile. There are currently five access pro-
files that are available to a patient when sharing his record
in Indivo: primary care provider, family member, friend,
school and research administrator. The users that have been
assigned the role of a provider has an additional access pro-
file to choose from - patient - that allows a provider to con-
nect with his patients in the system.
The Indivo access control model provides the patient
with the opportunity to share his record and to some extent
also to determine what access rights are granted. However
this control is limited by the predefined access profiles, and
the patient has no way of knowing the exact permissions in-
cluded in each profile. Through trials, system tests and fo-
cus groups the Indivo team has collected knowledge about
expected use of the system, as well as concerns and wishes
from the system users. This knowledge has been used to
formulate a set of usage scenarios and concerns that capture
requirements that needs to be fulfilled by a more compre-
hensive access control model for a PCHR. These usage sce-
narios and concerns are presented in detail in the next two
sections of the paper, and serves as a basis for our proposed
access control model for a PCHR.
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3 Usage Scenarios
The expected use of the system is best presented by a set
of usage scenarios. These scenarios have been selected be-
cause they illustrate the most common expected uses of the
system, as well as a set of identified likely, but uncommon,
use of a PCHR. All scenarios focus an sharing. The scenar-
ios illustrate usage around which design decisions have to
be made.
3.1 Patient moving or changing care
providers
Very few people live in the same place for their entire
life. One of the main purposes of a PCHR is to enable
patients to manage access to their own health information.
When moving or switching to a new care provider for other
reasons, the patient may use the PCHR to grant access to
his health information to his new health care provider.
3.2 Patient in need of medical care while
traveling
A patient may become ill or injured while traveling or
away from home. Through a PCHR the patient can give
health care providers access to the information they need to
provide proper care.
3.3 Sharing with family or friends
Sometimes a patient may want to share his health infor-
mation with family or friends. Common cases may include
young adults seeking advice from their parents, and persons
with chronic or long-term diseases who rely on help from
others. Yet another case that is expected to be common, is
elderly parents seeking advice and help from their younger,
and more computer-literate, children.
3.4 One-time sharing
There are several situations when a patient may want to
share selected health information for a very limited time.
Examples include colleges requesting access to the latest
physical examination, insurance companies requesting a bill
of health. For these situations the patient should be able to
limit the time sharing is valid for. However, if a patient
has chosen to share parts of his medical data with, say, an
insurance company for a limited time - there is no sure tech-
nological way to keep them from making a copy of the in-
formation and keep that in their own record. The only way
to force someone to ”forget” may be by law. But, through
time-limited sharing one can at least deny sharing of the
evolving data.
3.5 Sharing in emergency situations
In an emergency situation a PCHR can serve as a valu-
able source of information for the emergency care team.
Depending on the severity of the patients injuries he may
grant access or an access mechanism for emergency situa-
tions may be used.
3.6 Patient is an adolescent
When a patient is an infant or a child, the parent (or le-
gal guardians) typically have access to the medical records
and act as administrators on the patients behalf. They make
decisions about the circumstances and conditions for shar-
ing information. As the patient becomes older there may
be specific information he wants to keep from his parents.
When the patient becomes an adult he takes over as admin-
istrator. The parents does not have access anymore unless
the patient chooses to share with the parents. Complicating
the matter here is the fact that the rights and obligations of
an adolescent and his parents is regulated by the law. These
laws are specific to a country, or even state within a country,
and as such, even the definition of the age-range for an ado-
lescent may vary from one state to another. The question is
which rules prevail.
3.7 Patient has a legal guardian
If a patient, at any time in life, becomes incapable of
caring for his own interests due to incapacity or disability,
a legal guardian is appointed. The legal guardian is then
acting as administrator of the record on the patient’s behalf.
3.8 Sharing for research
Through a PCHR the patient can contribute his data to
research. What data is shared depends on the research
project. Sometimes, research studies reveal medical knowl-
edge about individuals that they should be made aware of.
However, as research data are usually de-identified, there is
no other means for researchers to get in touch with these
patients other than issuing a public notice and hoping that
they read it. In [14] it was proposed how the PCHR can
be utilized for this purpose. The authors suggested a model
where the researches could broadcast an electronic notice.
An agent within each patient’s PCHR could then examine
the notice and determine if the patient should be notified.
This way, the research subjects stay anonymous, but the re-
searchers has a means of reaching specific subjects with im-
portant, targeted information.
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4 Concerns
This section presents concerns that are common to all
usage scenarios. These concerns represent key points and
decisions that has to be made when designing the access
control model. We have identified three main groups of con-
cerns:
• Simplicity
• Time
• Transparency
Related concerns have been grouped under these headings.
We will continue to use these three main groups in our dis-
cussion, to justify and explain our choices.
4.1 Simplicity
This is a matter of what it means to grant the patient
control over his own information. What is detailed enough
to facilitate all usages scenarios - yet simple enough that
the patient is capable of doing it?
Patient control
In the simplest case; the patient is given a set of roles to
select from when sharing and the roles determine the per-
missions granted. The roles are predefined in the system
and the patient is not allowed to change them. The only op-
tions are sharing using one of those roles - or not sharing at
all.
On the other extreme, we have the possibility of giving
the patient complete control. When sharing the patient
could be allowed to specify exactly what information to
share and what permissions to grant on this information.
Sharing with identity and/or groups
Through the PCHR a patient should be able to share his
health information with his family, friends and health
care providers. It may be the case that the patient wants
to share his information with a practice rather than a
specific provider at that practice. How can the patient trust
this practice to enforce local access rules and protect his
privacy?
Delegation of sharing rights
When sharing information with a provider, this provider
may wish to share with other providers e.g. to get a second
opinion. If this is allowed the patient loses control over
who has access to his information. However, if this is not
allowed it means the provider has to ask the patient to grant
access to another provider, before they can interact. This
appears inconvenient.
Information sensitivity
All health information is considered sensitive. However,
some types of information, e.g. related to psychiatry and
STDs, may be considered to be more sensitive. Informa-
tion classification may be used to limit what information is
shared. The main questions here are: who determines what
information is ”more sensitive”? And how do we label this
information?
4.2 Time
Time is a central issue when sharing information. The
issue is the patient’s understanding of what is shared. Is it:
• a snapshot of the record at the time of sharing?
• only historical information?
• or the evolving record also as new information is
added?
Another issue related to time, is for how long the record is
shared. Is it forever or only for a limited time period? And
what happens when that time period is over?
4.3 Transparency
In a PCHR the users are given control to set access
permissions. Tasks that are usually performed by system
administrators are shifted to the users. To ensure that the
users are able to take advantage of the possibilities the
system presents without compromising their privacy, it is
important to strive to keep the users informed about the
consequences of their decisions to share. In other words the
consequences of actions should be transparent to the system
users. The question is how to keep the users informed.
Informed sharing
The patient needs to be informed about the consequences
of sharing. The key here is to keep the patient informed
of exactly what sharing means, so he can make informed
decisions. Consequences of sharing should be obvious and
the process of assigning access transparent.
Auditing
Extensive auditing is important to ensure traceability of ac-
tions. Audit logs are usually only accessible to system ad-
ministrators. When the user is in charge of his own infor-
mation, he should also be able to trace the actions of people
he is sharing with. Auditing system logs is a formidable
task. Providing the user with insight into access logs may
help making this task easier, assuming that the user has a
special interest in keeping track of who does what with his
health information. The key challenge is to make the audit
logs accessible and understandable to the patient.
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5 An Initial Access Control Model for a
PCHR
In this section we present our initial access control model
for a PCHR. The model is very much unfinished, but we
have chosen to put it forth to generate discussion on the sub-
ject. There are many aspects of access control for a PCHR
that needs to be explored further. In this section we provide
a sketch of what we consider most important to focus on,
and how we think this may be solved.
5.1 Simplicity
Simplicity and transparency is key when the patient is
put in charge of assigning access to other users. It should
be easy to do and the consequences of sharing, i.e. what
permissions are granted, should be obvious. Assigning per-
missions by selecting from a list of system-defined roles is
arguably a very simple way for a user to assign permissions,
but there is a tradeoff between simplicity and specificity that
needs to be considered. To allow for flexibility and adapt-
ability in privacy requirements, the user should be allowed
to change a role and/or create new roles with specific per-
missions to fit his needs. Ideally we should like to provide
both simplicity through role selection and complete speci-
ficity in selection of permissions for a user. To keep the
model clean and consistent we propose an approach that al-
lows us to do both, and keep the role as the base element for
access assignment.
Central to the concept of RBAC is the fact that there is
an administrator that is responsible for role creation. Cer-
tain models propose allowing the user some control on role
assignment and delegation [9] [15], but not on role creation
or adaption. In a PCHR the patient is the administrator.
Though this model takes advantage of the base principles
of RBAC, the viewpoint of the administrator is fundamen-
tally different from the usual RBAC case.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the main elements of
the proposed PCHR role model. There are two main classes
of roles:
• System roles: are assigned when a user is created in
the system. There are only three system roles: patient,
provider and researcher. These roles are used to restrict
the functionality available in the system, and as a con-
trol when sharing. E.g. a patient may only assign the
role of primary care provider to a user with the system
role ”provider”.
• User roles: are assigned by the patient to other system
users he wants to share his record with.
The system roles are straightforward. The user roles are
more complex. As Figure 1 shows, the user roles are struc-
tured as follows:
Figure 1. PCHR role model
• A set of system-defined user roles. These roles are
grouped into individual roles and group-roles. Group
roles allows sharing with a practice. The set of indi-
vidual roles should be fairly small, not more than 10.
T
• User-defined user roles. These are specific to each
user. The system maintains a repository for each user
of the roles he have created and assigned to other users
to share his record. These roles may be based on a tem-
plate (adapted from a system-defined role) or created
from scratch. A user-defined role may also be based on
one of the users previously defined roles. The user is
responsible for giving the roles he defines meaningful
names. Once a role is defined, the user may use this
role many times and assign it to several people.
The model adopts the principle of permission inheritance
from RBAC. The system-defined roles are structured in a
hierarchy where lower level roles inherit permissions from
higher level roles. The further down in the inheritance hi-
erarchy, the more specific the role is. For instance one may
have a parent role provider that specifies permissions com-
mon to all providers, and then a role primary care provider
that inherits all the permissions of the general provider role,
and adds permissions that are specific to a primary care
provider. When looking up permissions for a role, the pol-
icy of the target role is combined with the policies of its
parent roles.
To provide specificity, we want the PCHR users to be
able to subtract permissions as well. When basing a new
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role on an existing one it should be possible to make it more
restrictive in some areas, and add more permissions to oth-
ers. This means that the rule when combining roles for in-
heritance is ”deny overrides”. If one of the roles denies the
desired action, then the decision is deny.
In the case of a PCHR, a user may well be assigned to a
number of roles. But each role is linked to a specific record.
In other words, when a patient is sharing his record he se-
lects, or creates, only one role for this user. The assignment
of a user role is specific to a record.
One of the main pros of RBAC is the flexibility it pro-
vides. To update the permissions of many users one only
has to change the role they are all assigned to. This is a task
usually performed by a system administrator. As previously
stated, for the case of PCHR the patient is the administrator.
He can change the roles he has defined as he wishes and
these changes are reflected in the permissions of the user he
his sharing his record with. However, as Figure 1 shows the
user-defined roles may be connected to the system-defined
role that was a template for creation of this role. This link is
permanent through an inheritance relationship. This means
that any change in a system-defined role is reflected in all
user roles that is related to this role through an inheritance
relationship. We therefore need to be careful about allowing
updates of system-defined roles. If the role changes because
of an identified error in the definition or due to changes in
the law, these changes should propagate and be effective
throughout the system. However, if the change is a less se-
vere update we may want to keep links to the old version
of the system-defined role. The user only agreed to sharing
on the basis of what the role used to be, and it should not
be changed without giving the user the option of agreeing or
denying to share based on the updated role. To allow for this
the concept of history in the role hierarchies is introduced:
• A template-based user role is linked to a version of a
system-defined role. If the system-defined role is up-
dated, a new version is created and the links are main-
tained for user-roles who were based on the previous
version.
• Having complete history in both role sets (user-defined
and system-defined) ensures that the user can perform
auditing and examine who had what permissions to
his information at any given time. Without history of
roles, one would only be able to tell what role a user
had at some time, but could not be sure if the permis-
sions of the role were the same then as now.
• For the same reason a role should never be completely
deleted. Keeping history ensures that it is always pos-
sible to find a role, even if it is no longer part of the
active role set.
5.2 Time
Time is one of the main concerns listed in the previous
section. In our model we propose always labeling a role
assignment with a start time. The start time is required for
useful audit information. In addition it should be possible,
but not required, to set an end time of a role assignment.
5.3 Transparency
There currently exists a major push towards patient em-
powerment in health care. A PCHR system is a great tool
for patient empowerment as it enables the patient to exercise
control over his health information. However, it also means
shifting responsibility and tasks that have usually been per-
formed by educated system-administrators over to the user.
”Everyone” is a potential patient, and therefore a potential
user of a PCHR. It is safe to assume that these users will
span the entire range of computer-literacy. Many will be
well accustomed to the use of online services for informa-
tion management like online banking, while many others
will have little experience with web-based systems.
A PCHR is intended to contribute to the patients sense
of empowerment and control. To achieve this, the pro-
cess of sharing, and auditing the shares, must be intuitive
and transparent to the user. The goal is to make sure the
user is always informed of the consequences of his actions.
It is, however, hard to be sure that the user is always in-
formed, and correctly informed. We suggest increasing sys-
tem transparency by:
• Using graphics to visualize to the patient the conse-
quences of assigning a role. Figure 2 illustrates what
this might look like in a PCHR system, illustrated by
an adaption of the current Indivo-GUI. When the pa-
tient selects a role the permissions of this role are vi-
sualized in a cube representing the information in the
record. A dark field with grey characters illustrates no
access, a lighter shade and black characters illustrates
read access, while a white field illustrates edit access.
• Using a graphic notation to visualize an overview of
current or historical shares and their permissions.
• Also using this graphic notation when a user creates or
adapts a role. E.g. by allowing a user to drag-and-drop
a document from the sidebar menu onto the cube to
add it to a sharing.
• Presenting the user with a view of the audit log. This
allows the user to examine who has access to his record
and their actions.
Examining access logs is often an overwhelming task.
Still many systems rely on auditing of log data as a security
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Figure 2. Example graphic representation of access rights
mechanism. However, a study [16] indicates that these log
data are seldom used. By distributing this task to let each
patient be responsible for auditing the access log for his own
record, we reduce the workload. Our assumption is that
the patient is both more motivated and knowledgeable to be
able to detect any misuse of his health information. Having
access to the audit log also serves an educational purpose as
examining other user’s actions gives the patient insight into
what the people he is sharing with are allowed to do with is
information.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have presented a discussion of issues re-
lated to access control in a PCHR. Based on this discussion
we have explored some aspects of what such an access con-
trol model would be like. However a lot of work certainly
remains. In our model we have made some assumptions
that needs to be explored further. For instance, we assume
that most users, most of the time, will prefer sharing by se-
lecting a role from a list. We also assume that most users
will not want to set up specific permissions each time they
share. Though this appears to be a valid assumption, user
test should be performed and usage data collected to see if
this assumption holds. We intend to continue work on the
model with the goal of creating an implementation that can
be tested and evaluated properly. Our work will focus on
defining a default role set and continue exploring methods
for increasing the transparency of the system.
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